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This book is a translation and adaptation of the Dutch report De publieke kern van
het Internet (The public core of the Internet) that the Netherlands Scientific Council
for Government Policy presented to Bert Koenders, the Dutch Minster for Foreign
Affairs, on the 31st of March 2015. It advised the Dutch government to make cyber-
space and Internet governance a serious priority for its foreign policy. The success-
ful organisation of the Global Conference on Cyber Space in April 2015 (gccs2015)
in The Hague provided the Dutch government with an excellent stepping stone to
promote its goals of a safe and open Internet through the global arena of cyber
diplomacy. Dutch cyber diplomacy will be intensified in the wake of this confer-
ence, building – amongst others- on the insights and recommendations put for-
ward in this report.
The core messages in the original report and in this book are not limited to the
Netherlands however, but have a global appeal. Its main argument is that the Inter-
net’s infrastructure and core protocols should be regarded as a global public good
that is in need of protection against unwarranted interventions by states and other
parties. Its main policy recommendation is that states should work towards estab-
lishing an international standard that identifies the Internet’s core protocols as a
neutral zone in which governments, pursuing their national interests, are prohibi-
ted from interfering. This is a goal that is of crucial importance for all states whose
societies and economies depend on the integrity and functionality of the Internet.
Increasingly, that is the vast majority of states.
The original report was drawn up by a project team headed by Dennis Broeders,
senior research fellow at the Council and professor of Technology and Society at
Erasmus University Rotterdam. The other members of the group were Erik
Schrijvers and Lisa Vermeer, both research fellows at the Council. Member of the
Council Mark Bovens was also involved in the project.
While writing this report, the project group consulted numerous experts in the
fields of Internet governance and cybersecurity. Their comments were extremely
valuable and the Council would like to thank the interviewees for their time and
effort. The Council would also like to thank Jan van den Berg, Nico van Eijk,
Marieke de Goede, Erik Huizer and Corien Prins, who commented on earlier ver-
sions of the Dutch report.
Prof. André Knottnerus




The Internet’s core of key protocols and infrastructure can be considered a global
public good that provides benefits to everyone in the world. Countering the grow-
ing state interference with this public core requires a new international agenda for
Internet governance that departs from the notion of a global public good.
i n t e r n e t  g o v e r n a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  a n d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l
Everyday life without the Internet has become unimaginable. It is inextricably
interwoven with our social lives, our purchasing behaviour, our work, our rela-
tionship with the government and, increasingly, with our everyday objects, from
smart meters to the cars we drive and the moveable bridges we cross en route. For a
long time, Internet governance was the exclusive domain of what is known in
Internet circles as the ‘technical community’. That community laid the founda-
tions for the social and economic interconnectedness of our physical and digital
lives. Those foundations, with the Internet Protocol as their most prominent com-
ponent, continue to function as the robust substructure of our digital existence.
But the governance of that substructure has become controversial. The many eco-
nomic and political interests, opportunities and vulnerabilities associated with the
Internet have led governments to take a much greater interest in the governance of
the Internet. Moreover, in terms of policymaking, the centre of gravity has shifted
from what was primarily an economic approach (the Internet economy, telecom-
munications and networks) to an approach that focuses more on national and
other forms of security: the Internet of cybercrime, vulnerable critical infrastruc-
ture, digital espionage and cyberattacks. In addition, a growing number of coun-
tries are seeking to regulate their citizens’ online behaviour, for reasons ranging
from copyright protection and fighting cybercrime to censorship, surveillance and
control of their own populations on and through the Internet.
Attempts by national states to ‘fence off’ their own national area of cyberspace,
and their increased role in its governance, may have repercussions for the Inter-
net’s backbone infrastructure. The Internet was developed to operate internation-
ally, without regard for the user’s status or nationality – an underlying principle
that benefits all users. It is mainly the Internet’s public core, consisting of infra-
structure, protocols and standards, that routes data so that it reaches all four cor-
ners of the globe. If these protocols and standards fail or become corrupted, the
performance and integrity of the entire Internet is put at risk. The Internet is ‘bro-
ken’ if we can no longer assume that the data we send will arrive, that we can locate
the sites we are searching for, and that those sites will be accessible. Recently, how-
ever, a growing number of states have tampered with the Internet’s core infra-
structure in order to further their own national interests.
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In this regard, Internet governance is at a crossroads: the Internet has become so
important that states are no longer willing or able to regard it with the same
‘benign neglect’ that long set the tone for most countries. At the same time, how-
ever, states do have national interests that go beyond the governance of the Inter-
net as a collective infrastructure. It is imperative for the future of Internet gover-
nance to determine which part of the Internet should regarded as a global public
good – and thus safeguarded from improper interference – and which part should
be seen as the legitimate domain of national states, where they can stake a claim
and take up their role without harming the infrastructure of the Internet itself.
t h e  i n t e r n e t ’ s  c o r e  a s  a  g l o b a l  p u b l i c  g o o d
This study therefore argues that the backbone of the Internet must be regarded as a
global public good. As such, it should be protected against the interventions of
states that are acting only in their own national interest, thereby damaging that
global public good and eroding public confidence in the Internet. Global public
goods provide benefits to everyone in the world, benefits that can be gained or pre-
served only by taking specific action and by cooperating. The means and methods
for providing a global public good may differ from one case to the next and can be
undertaken by private or public parties, or combinations of the two. This can be
said to apply to the Internet both as a network and as an infrastructure.
These benefits derive largely from the Internet’s core protocols, including the
tcp/ip Protocol Suite, numerous standards, the Domain Name System (dns), and
routing protocols. As a global public good, the Internet only works properly if its
underlying values – universality, interoperability and accessibility – are guaranteed
and if it facilitates the main objectives of data security, i.e. confidentiality, integrity
and availability. It is vital that we – the users – can rely on the most fundamental
Internet protocols functioning properly: those protocols underpin the digital fab-
ric of our social and economic life. Our confidence in the integrity and continuity
of all we have built on the public core of the Internet – our digital existence – thus
very much depends on those underlying protocols. Although national states will
inevitably want to ‘create an Internet in their own image’, we must find ways to
continue guaranteeing the overall integrity and functionality of the public core of
the Internet.
f r o m  g o v e r n a n c e  of  t h e  i n t e r n e t  t o  g o v e r n a n c e  using  t h e
i n t e r n e t
To highlight the problem we can differentiate between two forms of Internet gov-
ernance. The first is governance of the Internet’s infrastructure, i.e. the governance
of the core infrastructure and protocols of the Internet. It is this public core that
drives the Internet’s development. The collective infrastructure takes precedence
in this form of governance. The second form is governance using the Internet’s
infrastructure. In this case, the Internet becomes a tool in the battle to control
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online content and behaviour. The issues vary from protecting copyright and intel-
lectual property to government censorship and surveillance of citizens. Increas-
ingly, governments view the infrastructure and main protocols of the Internet
itself as a legitimate means to achieve their policy ends. Whereas Internet gover-
nance used to mean governance of the Internet – with the technical management
and performance of its infrastructure being the top priority – the trend today is
increasingly towards governance using the Internet. Such interventions can under-
mine the integrity and functionality of the Internet and, in turn, undermine the
digital lives that we have built on top of it.
t h r e a t s  t o  g o v e r n a n c e  of  t h e  i n t e r n e t  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
Governance of the Internet’s public core – i.e. governance of the Internet – is
entrusted to a number of organisations that are collectively known as the ‘techni-
cal community’. Although that governance is mostly in good hands, pressure is
building on it from several quarters. Political and economic interests – sometimes
combined with new technologies – are challenging the collective character of the
network.
• Economic interests – for example copyright protection and revenue models for
data transport – are putting pressure on policymakers to abolish or, conversely,
offer legislative protection to net neutrality, previously the Internet’s default
setting.
• The transition of the ‘iana function’, which includes the stewardship and
maintenance of registries of unique Internet names and numbers. There is
mounting pressure to remove oversight of iana from the us’s sphere of influ-
ence, for reasons of international political legitimacy. The debate on this transi-
tion may result in more politicised management of the Domain Name System,
which in turn may have repercussions for the ability to find and locate sites and
users. Most countries would benefit from iana functions that are as ‘agnostic’
as possible, especially when it comes to the administrative tasks
• Another challenge is the rise of the national security mindset in cyberspace.
The technical approach of the certs (with a focus on ‘keeping the network
healthy’) and their international alliances is at odds with the approach of
national security actors, such as intelligence agencies and military cyber com-
mands. It is important to prevent these approaches becoming confused and/or
mixed, because national security conflicts with the collective interest of the
network’s overall security.
t h r e a t s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  g o v e r n a n c e  using  t h e  i n t e r n e t
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
The need for worldwide consensus on the importance of a properly functioning
public core of the Internet seems obvious because it is these protocols that guaran-
tee the reliability of the global Internet. However, recent international trends in
policymaking and legislation governing the protection of copyright, defence and
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national security, intelligence and espionage, and various forms of censorship,
show no signs of such a consensus. If anything, they show the contrary.
Some states see dns, routing protocols, Internet standards, the manipulation and
building of backdoors into software and hardware and the stockpiling of vulnera-
bilities in software, hardware and protocols (so called ‘zero-day vulnerabilities’) as
ideal instruments for national policies focused on monitoring, influencing and
blocking the conduct of people, groups and companies. The negative impact of
such interventions is borne by the collective, however, and impairs the Internet’s
core values and operation. Illustrations of this trend include:
• Various forms of Internet censorship and surveillance that use key Internet
protocols as well as enlisting the ‘services’ of Internet intermediaries such as
Internet Service Providers (isps) to block and trace content and users.
• The online activities of military cyber commands, intelligence and security
services which undermine the proper functioning of the public core of the
Internet. By corrupting Internet standards and protocols, by building back-
doors into commercial hardware and software and by stockpiling zero-day vul-
nerabilities, these actors effectively damage the collective Internet infrastruc-
ture and make it less secure.
• Legislation to protect copyright and intellectual property that permits the use
of vital Internet protocols to regulate and block content. ‘Side-effects’ of such
legislation include the collateral blocking of content and users (‘overblocking’),
damage to the dns and intermediary censorship through isps.
• Some forms of Internet nationalism and data nationalism – in which states
seek to fence off a national or regional part of the Internet – which require
interventions in routing protocols. In extreme forms this could lead to splin-
tering of the Internet.
t o w a r d s  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g e n d a  f o r  i n t e r n e t  g o v e r n a n c e
The international political landscape of Internet governance is also changing rap-
idly. The next billion (or billions) of users will go online in emerging economies
that may have a different cultural and political outlook on cyberspace from the still
dominant ‘Western’ view. In addition, many countries will have upgraded their
technical cyber capacity considerably within a few years, giving a much larger
group of states capacities that are currently reserved for only a few superpowers.
What is cutting edge today will be much more commonplace in five years’ time.
If in that same timeframe the idea takes hold that national states are at liberty to
decide whether or not to intervene in the Internet’s main protocols to secure their
own interests, the impact on the Internet as a public good is likely to be very dam-
aging. For this reason there is no time to lose in securing the public core of the
Internet.
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t h e  i n t e r n e t ’ s  p u b l i c  c o r e  s h o u l d  b e  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n e u t r a l
z o n e
Given these developments, it should be an internationally shared priority to work
towards establishing an international standard that identifies the main protocols of
the Internet as a neutral zone in which governments are prohibited from interfer-
ing for the sake of their national interests. This should be considered an extended
national interest, i.e. a specific area where national interests and global issues coin-
cide for all states that have a vital interest in keeping the Internet infrastructure
operational and trustworthy. With the continuing spread of the Internet and
ongoing digitisation, that is increasingly a universal concern.
• In order to protect the Internet as a global public good there is a need to estab-
lish and disseminate an international standard stipulating that the Internet’s
public core – its main protocols and infrastructure, which are a global public
good – must be safeguarded against intervention by governments.
The starting point should be to place the drafting of such a standard on the inter-
national political agenda, something that will entail making governments around
the world aware of the collective and national importance of this neutral zone.
Given the enormous differences between countries in terms of Internet access,
overall digitisation and technological capacity, this will require a serious diplo-
matic and political effort. This standard could be disseminated through relevant
un forums as well as though regional organisations such as the Council of Europe,
the oecd, the osce, asean and the au. This strategy would lay the foundations
for what could eventually expand into a broader regime.
t h e  n e e d  t o  d i s e n t a n g l e  i n t e r n e t  s e c u r i t y  a n d  n a t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y
The emphasis on national security comes at the expense of a broader range of
views on security and the Internet. Defining and disentangling different views on
security may in fact improve the security of the Internet as an infrastructure.
• It is therefore vital to advocate at international level that a clear differentiation
be made between Internet security (security of the Internet infrastructure) and
national security (security through the Internet) and to disentangle the parties
responsible for each.
It is of paramount importance to delineate the various forms of security in relation
to the Internet. At one end of the spectrum there is the notion of Internet security,
i.e. ensuring that the network itself is secure and operational. At the other end,
there is the notion of national security, with the focus on the state and the Internet
being regarded simultaneously as a source of threat and as a potential policy tool.
It is important to separate the technology-driven strategy of the certs, which
involves a public health-type approach to overall network security, from the logic
of national security, which places national interests above those of the network.
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t h e  n e e d  t o  b u i l d  n e w  c o a l i t i o n s  i n  c y b e r s p a c e
Given the international demographic and political shifts in cyberspace, it is time to
open, broaden and expand the arena for cyber diplomacy. There is a need to involve
states that are still building their technical and political cyber capacities fully in the
debates about Internet governance. Secondly, there is a strong case to be made for
targeting the large, Internet-based companies as explicit subjects of cyber diplo-
macy, as well as a need to think through and regulate what the role and position of
intermediary organisations on the Internet – such as Internet Service Providers
(isps) – is and should be. Lastly, states need to make more productive use of the
expertise of ngos and other private stakeholders, especially in thinking through
the effects of national and foreign policies on the technical operation of the Inter-
net as a whole.
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1 internet governance at a crossroads
Today’s Internet is a fortuitous accident. It came into being through a combination of an
initial lack of commercial interests, government benign neglect, military requirements for
survivability and resilience, and computer engineers building open systems that worked
simply and easily. Battles over its future are going on right now: in legislatures around the
world, in international organizations like the itu, and in Internet organizations like the
igf.
Bruce Schneier (2013: 13)
1 .1 introduction
Everyday life without the Internet has become unimaginable. Everything – the
economy, our social lives, our infrastructure and public life in general – ties into
and branches out from it. And it will become even more important in the decades
ahead as the ‘Internet of Things’, cloud computing and mobile data technology
gather momentum and new applications come along that we cannot envisage yet.
All this means that our social, public and economic lives will depend increasingly
on an infrastructure that spans the globe and is, in essence, non-territorial.
That infrastructure – the software and protocols underpinning the Internet – was
built by private parties and an international technical community; except for sub-
stantial investments in the Internet’s early development, governments have
mainly been involved indirectly.
Most people are unacquainted with and uninterested in the deep layers that deter-
mine how the network operates, just as they are unfamiliar with the workings of
their car engine. They don’t really care how their car works, as long as it does.
They leave the rest to the experts. For a long time, the same was true of the Inter-
net. It began life as arpanet, a small network of American universities and the us
Department of Defense, and was known only among the true pioneers, who
maintained, modified and expanded the network themselves. As the Internet
grew, and especially after the 1991 launch of the World Wide Web (www), which
made it possible to access information simply by ‘surfing’ between websites,
it became increasingly important to our everyday lives. At the same time, the
Internet’s ‘engine’ and physical infrastructure faded more and more from the view
of everyday users.
States now take a keen interest in the Internet. Whereas fifteen years ago, newspa-
pers tended to report on the Internet’s economic potential – with the ‘dot.com
bubble’ in around 2000 as a glitch in the rise of the www – today’s Internet fea-
tures in virtually every aspect of public and political life. Politicians recognise that
it has become one of the pillars of the economy and intrinsic to people’s social and
professional lives. They also recognise that cybercrime is on the increase; they
observe that all our critical infrastructures are in fact linked to the Internet; they
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realise that Google, Apple and Facebook know more about their citizens than they
do, and exploit that information; and they see how the military and intelligence
communities are becoming increasingly active and intrusive online. With the
Internet taking centre stage and at the root of so many opportunities and threats, a
growing number of authorities have become interested in its deeper layers and
how they are governed.
As a global infrastructure, however, the Internet is at odds with a world in which
states do their utmost to secure their national interests online. While it is certainly
not the case that national policy has no impact on the Internet – or rather, on the
parties that shape, maintain and use the Internet – the international nature of the
Web often makes it very difficult for states to secure their national interests.
There is also little international cooperation – let alone international political con-
sensus – on the issue of the Internet’s governance. That does not mean that the
Internet is ungoverned, of course. On the contrary, over the past thirty years it has
been managed, developed and expanded by a network – which arose more or less
from the bottom up – of private parties, ngos, academics and also authorities, in
what is known as a multistakeholder system (see e.g. Goldsmith and Wu 2008;
Mueller 2010; Deibert 2013; DeNardis 2014). However, states are now demanding a
bigger role for themselves, putting enormous pressure on the bottom-up nature of
this system. There is no consensus among states, nor among the other stakehold-
ers, on the choices that need to be made concerning the future of Internet gover-
nance, even though some of those choices may have huge implications for the way
the Internet itself operates.
This book aims to outline an international policy agenda for Internet governance
that makes some of those necessary choices. It proceeds from the need to strike the
right balance between guaranteeing and protecting the Internet infrastructure as a
global public good on the one hand, and integrating the Internet as a normal part of
international and diplomatic relations on the other.
1 .2 internet governance at a crossroads
The fact that states are claiming a greater role for themselves in Internet gover-
nance is no surprise, given that the Internet has become a vital component of their
economies and societies. The laissez-faire attitude long taken by most countries is
now considered by many to be imprudent and inappropriate. That does not mean
that every state has a clear notion of what the Internet is and how it can best be
regulated. In fact, opinions are very much divided on matters such as freedom of
speech, fighting cybercrime and the protection of intellectual property rights.
Such matters are part and parcel of both national policymaking traditions and
international diplomatic relations between states. The fact that some of these
issues are online manifestations of old problems does not necessarily alter them,
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but it does mean taking a very different approach at times, and seeking a very dif-
ferent form of international cooperation. This book aims to contribute to an inter-
national governance agenda that focuses on the Internet’s deep technological lay-
ers and software protocols. It does not address directly such vital issues as online
freedom of speech or the mass surveillance of personal data as separate issues, but
instead considers them when state policies use the deeper layers of the Internet and
in doing so pose a threat to its integrity and its operational functionality. The relia-
bility of the Internet – both technically and in terms of ‘trust’ – depends on how its
‘public core’ operates. If the Internet fails, is unreliable, then it is unreliable for
every Internet user around the world. And although some states will inevitably
want to ‘create the Internet in their own image’, there is a need to find ways to con-
tinue guaranteeing the general operability of its core.
1 . 2 . 1 a  g l o b a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  a n d  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s
Some authors believe that Internet governance has reached a crossroads in which
two worlds are set to clash: the global and non-territorial world of the Internet ver-
sus the world of national states, with territorial sovereignty as the organising prin-
ciple of international relations. Sovereignty and the Internet appear to be irrecon-
cilable concepts. The Internet itself is not restricted by national borders and the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (tcp/ip) has been set up to
ensure that packets of information basically always arrive at the right destination.
Or, as John Gilmore put it: ‘The net interprets censorship as damage and routes
around it’ (quoted in Maher 2013). At the same time, however, states are increas-
ingly trying to control the global Internet, subject it to national policies and/or
regulate it internationally. Some do so to control their own people, some to defend
their economic interests, and some to enforce their sovereignty by military means.
It is clear that states are increasingly inclined to draw borders in cyberspace and
introduce the concept of territorial sovereignty to the Internet. Just as the Wild
West was gradually absorbed and tamed by the usa, so some commentators main-
tain that states will do the same to the ‘anarchist Internet’. Others refer to the rise
of a ‘Westphalian model’ on the Internet. This is a reference to the Peace of West-
phalia, signed in 1648, in which the concept of sovereign states became the legiti-
mate organising principle for international relations. Here, it is used to indicate
that states wish to claim sovereignty on the global Internet. Demchak and
Dombrowksi (2011; 2013: 33) warn that a cyber-Westphalian doctrine cannot
emerge without ending in conflict: ‘The process of establishing cyber borders and
thus states’ sovereignty will be non-linear, dangerous and lengthy’. It is a process
that fits in with a broader trend towards renationalisation, where a belief in the
advantages of economic and cultural globalisation – which long set the standard
and which produced many benefits – is set off against national interests. For exam-
ple, acting under the banner of economic security, states are considering the
relationship between international investment, transnational take-overs and geo-
political trends on the one hand, while simultaneously protecting their own
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industries and critical infrastructures. How can countries that are deeply inte-
grated into the global economy navigate a course between naivety and paranoia
(nctv 2014)? Even with respect to the global Internet, states must weigh their
national interests against the international net. The three quotes that follow illus-
trate how much the role of states and opinions about that role have changed in
recent years.
‘We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running
code’
In 1992, this is how David Clark, a professor at mit and an Internet pioneer,
described how the ‘Internet community’ tackled what is now known as ‘Internet
governance’ (quoted in Goldsmith and Wu 2008: 24). It rejected democratic deci-
sion-making on how the network should develop, nor did it accept top-down
political authority. Rough consensus between the engineers and other stakehold-
ers, who regarded the Internet mainly as a technological challenge, was sufficient.
In their eyes, it was essentially a non-political network that through technological
breakthroughs and a growing mass of users gradually turned into a global ‘network
of networks’. Although the Internet certainly had government to thank for its
early development – in particular the government of the United States – most
countries for a long time regarded it as scarcely needing governance, or even con-
sidered it uncontrollable to a certain extent.
‘Good luck! That’s sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall’
Six years later, us President Bill Clinton was still convinced that the Internet was
ungovernable. His statement came in 1998 after attempts by China to control and
spy on the Internet, and more specifically on Chinese Internet users (quoted in
Goldsmith and Wu 2008: 90). Widely regarded as one of the first censorship and
surveillance projects targeting the Internet and Internet users, it introduced the
expression ‘Great Firewall of China’ to the modern language. We are now several
generations of Internet surveillance further and the technology used to detect and
monitor users has become ever more refined (Deibert et al. 2008; 2010; 2011).
Or, as Tim Wu (2010: 309) puts it: ‘The Jello was, somehow, nailed to the wall’.
The Internet is no longer the sanctuary it used to be for anonymous users. Busi-
nesses and government authorities monitor the behaviour of Internet users
closely. Businesses do so because data about users’ online behaviour can be turned
into profit in various ways; the authorities do so because they believe that such
data hold the key to increased security and tighter control of the population.
Of course, different countries have different ideas about what security entails.
Dutch, Iranian, American, and Russian concepts of security and freedom contrast
starkly, both on the Internet and in the ‘real’ world. Unlike his predecessor Clin-
ton, us President Barack Obama has long abandoned the notion that the Internet is
uncontrollable. The revelations about the global surveillance practices of the
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National Security Agency (nsa) have intensified the debate about the future of the
Internet (Greenwald 2014). For a well-funded organisation like the nsa, at any rate,
the opportunities appear to be unlimited.
‘The Internet is a cia project’
So claimed Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in April 2014 during a media forum
in St Petersburg,1 one of many signs that the concept of the Internet as a global,
apolitical network is waning. Or, put better, that politicians do not accept it as
such. Politicians are making an ever-stronger case for the need to control the Inter-
net. Yet another development, which many see as worrisome, is the militarisation
of the Internet, with a growing list of countries regarding it as the fifth domain of
warfare (after land, sea, air and space) and rapidly building up military cyber
capacity and cyber intelligence services (see e.g. Singer and Friedman 2014;
Guitton 2013; Deibert 2013; Dunn Cavelty 2013). That brings the Internet into the
realm of high politics, i.e. the domain of national and international security. And
once it has landed there, states are unlikely to go back to viewing it with benign
neglect.
1 . 2 . 2 t h e  i n t e r n e t  a s  a  g l o b a l  p u b l i c  g o o d ?
Although the Internet operates in a world ruled by states, it has an enormous
global significance. At its most basic, it was developed to operate internationally,
regardless of the user’s status or nationality – an underlying principle that is bene-
ficial to all users. The Internet has derived its strength from its growth and from its
impressive ability to accommodate billions of users and new applications in the
first decades of its existence. Or, as Vint Cerf (2013: 7) – one of the ‘fathers of the
Internet’ – put it, ‘The resources of the Internet, while finite, are not bounded
except by our ability to construct more resource to grow the shared virtual space
the Internet and its applications create’.
Thanks to its international design and global significance, parts of the Internet bear
the markings of a global public good. Global public goods provide benefits to
everyone in the world, benefits that can be gained or preserved only by taking tar-
geted action and by cooperating. The ‘public’ part of a public resource lies in the
fact that it affects all, or in the need for it to be available to all. That says nothing,
however, about how that resource must be provided. The means and methods for
the provision of a global public good may differ from one case to the next and can
be undertaken by private or public parties, or combinations of the two (Lieshout,
Went and Kremer 2010). The same can be said to apply to the Internet as a network
and infrastructure. In that context, the public part refers not to the content of the
www or to the Internet as a public sphere, but to the operation of the Internet as a
system that makes all the applications and content possible. Laura DeNardis (2014:
17) has pointed out the vital importance of the operation of that network: ‘no less
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than economic security, modern social life, culture, political discourse, and
national security are at stake in keeping the Internet globally operational and
secure’.
Pure global public goods have two essential traits: they are non-excludable and
non-rivalrous. In other words, no one can be excluded from using the good, and
one person’s use is never at the expense of another person’s. Strictly speaking, that
does not hold true of the Internet. Both the authorities and businesses can exclude
people from using it. Internet access and use is also not free, which in itself makes
it excludable. Indeed, some governments – for example Egypt in 2011 – have even
switched off the Internet during periods of unrest and crisis by shutting down the
networks for a few days. However, both traits do apply to the way in which the
technical community has set up the Internet and nurtured its development.
To quote DeNardis again (2013: 4): ‘With the exception of repressive political con-
texts of censorship, the Internet’s core values are universality, interoperability and
accessibility’. These core values focus on including, not excluding. The technical
and logical core of the Internet, i.e. the basic protocols that determine how the net-
work and data traffic are operated, is thus founded on values that support non-
excludability. The history of the Internet’s growth shows that its stakeholders
have gone to great lengths to make it non-rivalrous by expanding its capacity again
and again. Given sufficient technical progress – i.e. an increase in bandwidth and
computing power – the set-up of the Internet is such that there is enough for
everyone. In this book, the Internet’s core is therefore regarded as an impure global
public good,2 in the same way that infrastructure is, for example (Went 2010).
1 . 2 . 3 g l o b a l  v e r s u s  n a t i o n a l :  a  k e y  p r o b l e m  o f  i n t e r n e t  g o v e r n a n c e
National states are demanding more space and a greater role on the Internet, and
specifically in matters of Internet governance. This trend may have implications
for the core technical and logical infrastructure of the Internet as a global public
good. States have had little input into the design and set-up of the structure that
has governed the Internet since the 1980s and fostered its spectacular growth. Now
that they are weighing in with a broad spectrum of national interests, some of
them contradictory, and with their differing interpretations of freedom and secur-
ity, the challenge is to give their national and international interests a greater say in
this governance structure without damaging the public core – the very basis for the
Internet’s growth. Many researchers believe that the battle for the future of the
Internet is being waged right now. Ronald Deibert’s 2013 book is entitled Black
code. Inside the battle for cyberspace; the first chapter heading of Milton Mueller’s
book Networks and states (2010) is ‘A battle for the soul of the Internet’; and
Laura DeNardis’ latest book (2014) is entitled The global war for Internet gover-
nance. The question of how we can balance national interests against the gover-
nance of the Internet as a global public good is one that requires a mainly interna-
tional response. The contributions of individual countries to this question are
20 t h e  p u b l i c  c o r e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n e t
shaped by their own foreign and national policies, which radiate out to affect other
nations as well as the international domain. Those effects can naturally be either
positive or negative.
1 .3 setting the scene:  three trends in cyberspace
As the international agenda regarding the Internet and the battle for its governance
evolves, three trends are playing themselves out in the background that are partic-
ularly critical for the international arena. They are the demographic shift among
worldwide Internet users, the securitisation and militarisation of the Internet, and
the ‘datafication’ of society. Obviously, other trends that have a major impact on
the development of the Internet could also be identified, specifically technological
ones such as mobile data access and cloud computing. We will address those
trends whenever they are important for our analysis. The trends that we focus on
here are distinctive because they are a major influence on the international political
arena.
1 . 3 . 1 d e m o g r a p h i c  s h i f t
The Internet is rapidly conquering the world. In 2012, a little less than two and a
half billion people were online. The Internet penetration rate is greatest in the
West, where it ranges from 63.2 percent in Europe to 78.6 percent in the United
States.3 Indeed, many parts of the Western world are reaching saturation point.
Today, growth there can largely be attributed to the rise in the number of Internet-
enabled devices that each of us owns. The penetration rates in Africa (15.6%) and
Asia (27.5%) are much lower, but the absolute number of users in Asia for example
is many times higher. Asia has more than a billion Internet users, with China alone
accounting for half that number. According to statistics collected in 2011, English
was still slightly ahead of Chinese as the dominant language online, but the growth
rates indicate that it has probably lost its lead by now. Between 2000 and 2011, the
number of English-speaking Internet users increased by 301 percent, while the
number of Chinese-speaking users grew by 1478 percent and the number of
Arabic-speakers by 2501 percent (Choucri 2012: 61). Deibert (2013) believes that the
Internet is undergoing a demographic shift in which the centre of gravity is mov-
ing from the North and West to the East and South of the planet. Figure 1 shows
worldwide Internet penetration and the regions where there is room for growth.
The lighter the colour, the more potential for increasing the number of Internet
users.
This shift has major consequences for the balance of power on the Internet and
how cyberspace is viewed culturally. The next billion people to go online will live
in relatively poor countries, have different cultural and political traditions from
users in the West, and have governments that have different ideas about online
security and freedom.
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Figure 1.1 Internet users and Internet penetration worldwide, 2013
Source: Graham, De Sabatta and Zook (2015)
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All these things will have repercussions for European and ‘Western’ foreign policy
regarding the Internet. A recent report by the Council on Foreign Relations (2013:
67) calls on the us government to make this new reality the basis for its foreign
cyber policy: ‘The United States can no longer rely on its role as progenitor of the
Internet to claim the mantle of leadership’. The ‘Western’ voice may no longer
dominate the Internet debate. In terms of Internet governance, the world may be
divided into two camps: a camp that wants to reinforce the current bottom-up,
multistakeholder model, and a camp that, conversely, wants more top-down influ-
ence for national states. In between these two extremes is a large group of coun-
tries known as ‘swing states’ or ‘fence-sitters’, which have not defined their posi-
tion or come down clearly on one side or the other (see e.g. Maurer and Morgus
2014; Clemente 2013). As other notions of what the Internet is and should be gain
political traction, they will shape the political playing field on matters of the Inter-
net’s design and future in the international domain.
1 . 3 . 2 s e c u r i t i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r n e t
The security mindset is rife on the Internet. Cybercrime has clearly increased, and
the rising number of companies that are now venturing online – connecting even
their most basic processes to the Internet – has made the economy all the more
vulnerable. Governments also see growing threats; in addition to cybercrime and
the theft of trade secrets and confidential corporate data, they are becoming
increasingly worried about the vulnerability of critical infrastructures and about
economic and political espionage by other states. In its Cyber Security Assessment
Netherlands 2013, published shortly before the start of the Snowden revelations,
the Netherlands Cyber Security Centre had already explicitly named China, Rus-
sia, Iran and Syria in that context, but can now add its allies the usa and the uk to
its list of cyber spies. Although threats to cybersecurity are increasing, it is difficult
to say to what extent – because much of the relevant data are missing or biased4 –
and which are the realistic scenarios for the future. That makes it hard to see
whether the rising budgets and growing attention on the part of policymakers are
in proportion to the actual danger involved and/or focused on the right threat.
The term ‘threat inflation’ is often used to explain the rapidly expanding cyber-
security budgets and legislated powers, certainly in the United States (Libicki 2012;
Lin 2012; Rid 2013).
The Internet has also been elevated to the highest echelons of security policy in
recent years. Cybersecurity and cyber warfare are rapidly growing areas of policy-
making that have access to mounting budgets and an increasing scope of powers
(Bauman et al. 2014; Guitton 2013; Severs 2013). The Internet’s growing status as a
domain of warfare also influences the way states view it. Many countries now con-
sider the Internet to be the fifth domain of warfare, after land, sea, air and space.
The language of war and national security affects the way the authorities regard the
Internet. Some in government circles say that such language is critical as threat
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piles upon threat; others, including some military strategists, question the useful-
ness of this framing. But terminology such as ‘cybergeddon’ (World Economic
Forum 2014) and ‘digital Pearl Harbor’ (Clarke and Knake 2010) only fuels what the
Copenhagen School of International Relations calls ‘securitisation’. This particular
school of thought argues that security threats are not objective facts but are rather
the product of political discourse. Issues are thus politicised, placing them on the
political agenda; in extreme cases, they are even ‘securitised’ (Lawson 2013: 88).
When that happens, the issue is no longer ‘debated as a political question, but dealt
with at an accelerated pace and in ways that may violate normal legal and social
rules’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23, quoted in Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1158).
Securitisation carries the risk that vital safeguards under the rule of law, demo-
cratic control and transparency of governance will be weakened in favour of rapid
decision-making and national security. A good example is the us and other gov-
ernments’ political, military and legislative response to 9/11.5
Some researchers believe that cybersecurity and cyber warfare have also become
part of a securitised discourse (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009; Dunn Cavelty 2013;
Singer and Friedman 2013). The fact that governments are taking serious action on
national and international cybersecurity in response to what is a relatively poorly
defined threat and despite much disagreement on a number of critical questions
– such as ‘what is a cyber attack?’ and ‘what is cyber warfare?’ – may have huge
consequences. It could lead to the far-reaching militarisation of the cyber domain
(Libicki 2012; Dunn Cavelty 2012) and the rise of a new cybermilitary-industrial
complex (Brito and Watkins 2011; Deibert 2013). It could also lead to an arms race
in cyberspace (Nye 2011). And – as has often been the case in the past – the very
response to danger may even give rise to other, new dangers. The advent of secur-
ity as a key issue on the Internet – as opposed to the economic perspective that
states adhered to in the Internet’s early days – has profound consequences for the
way in which states position themselves with respect to Internet governance and
the priorities that they set.
1 . 3 . 3 t h e  d a t a  r e v o l u t i o n
The third crucial trend for the future of Internet governance is datafication.
There are three factors that play a role in datafication: the volume of data, the
nature of the data and their analysis, and how and where the data are used
(Van Dijck 2014; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). The gigantic increase in the
volume of data collected on human behaviour – whether or not it was provided
voluntarily – and corporate and government recording and storage of data and
metadata have changed the Internet and the way we perceive it. Data have become
the lifeblood of Internet businesses and ‘data is the new oil’ has become a new
catch phrase. Companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google collect data on
users in exchange for applications that are provided ‘free of charge’. The advent of
mobile Internet technology means that the data they collect is not confined to user
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behaviour online but also connects to our daily geographical movements. They
then use the data to match advertisers and customers as closely as possible. In the
current era of Big Data, ‘more is better’ has also come to apply to the way we look
at the world. With more data being collected, the nature of the data collections and
their analysis have also changed. Many see the ability to combine as much data as
possible and to use statistical analysis to distil correlations and conclusions
– sometimes unexpected ones – as a source of new applications and markets in the
Internet economy (Degli Esposito 2014). The authorities have also cottoned on to
the vast number of ways that Big Data can be analysed and used, for example in
health care, in municipal government, and – last but not least – in the area of secur-
ity. The gathering momentum of Big Data has enormous implications for such
issues as privacy and data protection, for the way research is conducted (more
data-mining, less hypothesis-driven), and for the international balance of power
on and in relation to the Internet.
Increasingly, datafication is ‘everywhere’. A typical example is the rise of the Inter-
net of Things (IoT). One of the major forces in this area, Cisco Systems, has gone a
step further and now speaks of the ‘Internet of Everything’. The IoT refers to the
way in which countless devices are connected and ‘communicate’ with one
another online. They obviously include mobile phones, but also things such as
refrigerators and cars (‘on-board computers’), industrial machinery and logistical
processes. Advances such as these shift questions of data management and security
from the computer and telephone to other devices and purposes. Doing so also
blurs the line between online and offline activities – a trend to which various
researchers drew attention in a 2014 advisory report presented to the European
Commission and bearing the apt title The Onlife Manifesto.6
With data now being so critical to the way businesses view customers and govern-
ments view citizens – their own and those of other countries – data storage, man-
agement and analysis have also gained importance in the international domain.
Privacy and personal data protection are sacrosanct concepts in eu legislation, rela-
tively speaking, but the new reality of datafication is putting pressure on the rights
and safeguards that have been enshrined in policy and legislation. eu rules on per-
sonal data protection enacted in 1995 had a radiating effect on the rest of the world
(a ‘Brussels effect’ – Bradford 2012). The eu has been negotiating new rules since
2012, and the question is whether the new Regulation will have the same sort of
impact. Some aspects, for example the size of fines for data misuse, may have
major consequences. With the eu potentially setting the standard for the rest of
the world, and with vast amounts of ever more valuable data being collected, there
are major interests at stake in this new eu legislation.
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Some businesses now know much more about the citizens of a particular country
than their own governments do, even though it used to be governments that were
in control of the biggest data collections (Taylor and Broeders 2015). This has natu-
rally not escaped the latter’s notice. One of the most shocking revelations about
the nsa was the extent to which its surveillance activities focused on data collec-
ted by the private sector, and the degree to which us companies ‘assisted’ the nsa
in that regard (Greenwald 2014). In 2013, the historian Timothy Garton-Ash wrote
in the ‘opinion’ section of The Guardian that the conclusion was clear: ‘were Big
Brother to come back in the 21st century, he would return as a public-private part-
nership’ (see also Lyon 2014). The nsa revelations showed how much data certain
companies – most of them American – actually collect and to what extent govern-
ments can access those data. Bruce Schneier (2013) claims that we live in what is in
fact the feudal age of the Internet, with power resting in the hands of large Internet
companies and governments. The users, who seemed so unfettered and powerful
in the early days, have come to depend on these feudal lords for their security, pri-
vacy and other online rights, without having much influence over them. To a cer-
tain extent, large Internet companies and governments are condemned to work
together, with the balance of power sometimes tipping towards one and then
towards the other. But Big Data management and the potential for far-reaching
surveillance – commercial, government or combined – also has implications for the
international balance of power and inter-state relations.
1 .4 aim and structure of the book
This book focuses on the future of international Internet governance and the con-
tribution that national states can make, either on their own or as part of regional
and international organisations and other international coalitions. It aims to con-
tribute to an international agenda for Internet governance that strikes a balance
between guaranteeing and protecting the core protocols and infrastructure of the
Internet as a global public good on the one hand, and normalising the Internet as a
component of international relations on the other. Given the significance of the
global net, Internet-related issues should be an integral part of any modern foreign
policy.
Chapter 2 looks more closely at Internet governance by drawing an analytical dis-
tinction between ‘governance of the Internet’s architecture’ and ‘governance using
the Internet’s architecture’. As a global public good, the Internet is mainly categor-
ised under the former heading, but it can be put at risk when states develop
national policies that use the internet’s architecture in a technically ill-advised
manner. Chapter 2 argues that securing the Internet as a global public good can be
considered an extended national interest for all states that depend on the Internet
for their economic growth and socioeconomic vitality.
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Chapters 3 and 4 build on the analytical distinction between ‘governance of the
Internet’ and ‘governance using the Internet’. Chapter 3 investigates governance of
the Internet and discusses how the Internet’s public core is managed. That public
core is founded on values such as universality, interoperability, accessibility, integ-
rity, availability and confidentiality, which all go to guarantee the functionality of
‘the Internet’ as a global system for its users. The task of living up to those values
and fulfilling those functions has been entrusted to various institutions, protocols
and standards. The ‘Team Internet’ that manages these protocols and functions is
highly efficient and effective in many ways, but falls short in others. Shortcomings
can be attributed both to design flaws and frictions between what is best for the
Internet technically and the network administrators’ revenue models (for example
the problem of upgrading from ip4 to ip6) and to political and economic interests
and legitimacy issues. Other problems have found their way onto the international
agenda because the growing economic and political significance of the Internet has
attracted new parties and stakeholders that meddle in the technical operation and
governance of the public core. In each case, conflicts about the governance of the
public Internet are more likely to be caused by shifts in international political
and/or economic relations than by dissatisfaction about the technical operation of
the Internet.
Chapter 4 addresses four controversies – most of them national in origin – con-
cerning interventions in the Internet’s core protocols and principles. The first
involves a series of recent draft acts and an international treaty to protect copyright
and intellectual property rights online. The second is about one of the most diffi-
cult problems from an international human rights perspective: censorship and
restrictions on freedom of speech. Both controversies illustrate the pivotal role
that Internet Service Providers (isps) are assigned and/or pressured into in regulat-
ing the behaviour of consumers, users and corporations. The third controversy is
the growing online presence of the intelligence agencies and military cyber com-
mands and the implications this has not only for privacy but also for the integrity
of the Internet’s technical operations. The fourth and final controversy concerns
attempts by states to nationalise parts of the Internet and what this means for its
operation and functionality of the Internet as a whole. Each of these controversies
involves actual or potential infringements of the principles of universality, inter-
operability and accessibility caused by actions, policy and legislation that place
national and/or economic interests above the interests of the Internet’s public
core.
Chapter 5 presents conclusions and recommendations. The conclusion of this
book is that it is technically possible to damage the integrity and reliability of the
Internet’s public core, making its operation as a whole unreliable. It would there-
fore benefit Internet governance to organise public and private power and counter-
power in a way that enhances the integrity of the Internet and freedom online.
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Based on three principles of negarchy – division, mixture and restraint – a number
of recommendations are made to shape a new international agenda for Internet
governance. The first item on that agenda should be to secure the Internet’s public
core against improper state interference driven by national interests. A norm of
non-intervention should be adopted for the Internet’s core architecture. The sec-
ond aim is to reframe international cyberpolitics so that Internet governance and
national or international security are demarcated, for example by making a clearer
distinction between different forms of security and the parties involved. The third
aim of the agenda concerns cyber diplomacy and involves broadening the diplo-
matic arena and investing in new international coalition-building.




2 Because it is technically possible to exclude people from the Internet, economists refer to it as
a ‘club good’, i.e. a good whose benefits accrue only to members. My decision to refer to it as
an impure global public good is based on the technical and protocol-related set-up of the
Internet as described above, with universality, interoperability and accessibility as its core
values.
3 Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this section have been taken from Internet World
Stats: www.Internetworldstats.com.
4 Good data is in short supply because many threats play themselves out in the private com-
mercial domain. Because they fear damaging their reputations, companies are not keen for
their vulnerability to become public knowledge. Cybersecurity companies (the MacAfees of
the world), on the other hand, find it useful for companies to regard threats as major inci-
dents. And information provided by intelligence services adds to the sense of threat: it can-
not be verified and may also be biased (see also Broeders 2014).
5 See, for example, the Human Rights Watch (2012) report In the name of security, which
analyses 130 countries that introduced or amended counterterrorism legislation in the wake
of 9/11. Many of these ‘post-September 11 laws, when viewed as a whole, represent a broad
and dangerous expansion of government powers to investigate, arrest, detain, and prosecute
individuals at the expense of due process, judicial oversight, and public transparency’ (p. 4).
6 See: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-04093-6.
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2 freedom, security and internet
governance
Internet governance structures were originally based on familiarity, trust, and expertise
and on ‘rough consensus and running code’. Things have changed.
Laura DeNardis (2014: 18)
2.1 introduction: states and internet governance
The future of cyberspace depends on the extent to which governments show
themselves capable of pursuing their national interests on the Internet without
damaging its public core. It also depends on the continued efforts of a large number
of private, commercial, technical and civil-society parties that have made the Inter-
net what it is today. In practical terms, they are the Internet’s mainstay and the
engine that has driven its turbulent growth over the past thirty years. The fact that
states are now claiming a bigger role for themselves will not change that entirely or
any time soon. Milton Mueller (2010: 8) uses the notion of ‘networked governance’
to describe this multi-actor system; technically speaking, the Internet is a network
of networks involving a large number of networked actors who must resolve issues
of ‘rights, authority and distributional conflict’ in cyberspace. Collaboration is by
no means a given, however: ‘what is a loose network today may become a more
institutionalized – and possibly hierarchical – form of interaction tomorrow’
(Mueller 2010: 8).
The time has come to give serious thought to this latter idea. For various reasons of
their own, states are putting pressure on the institutions currently active in Inter-
net governance. Some do so because they want more leeway to control the use of
cyberspace in their own territory and to ‘nationalise’ the net. One example is the
debate about whether the us Department of Commerce should continue to over-
see the work of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(icann), which issues and administers ip addresses and domain names (known as
the ‘iana functions’, for Internet Assigned Names Authority), or whether over-
sight should be transferred to another party, such as the United Nations, for exam-
ple its International Telecommunication Union (itu). A key factor in this debate is
opposition to the influence that a single state, the us, is exerting on icann. State
pressure may also be motivated by a perceived need to tighten up cybersecurity.
Lewis (2013: 3), for example, states that ‘the greatest challenge to the legitimacy of
the existing multi-stakeholder structure is its failure to make the Internet more
secure’. Other states claim that the structures that have evolved over the past thirty
years have not kept up with the changing landscape of international politics, both
in cyberspace and beyond.
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The current emphasis on national security does raise serious questions about the
way state influence is growing in cyberspace, however. Ronald Deibert (2013a:
9-10) puts it this way:
There is an instinctive tendency in security-related discussions to default to the tradition
of realism, with its accompanying state-centrism, top-down hierarchical controls and
erection of defensive perimeters to outside threats. In the creation of cyber commands, in
spiralling arms races among governments, in ‘kill switches’ on national Internets and in
the rising influence of the world’s most secretive agencies into positions of authority over
cyberspace, we see this tradition at play.
Others share his concern, but also feel that it is no more than logical for states to
claim their place in Internet governance. The transition to a system in which gov-
ernments gradually replace the informal communities that currently dominate
Internet governance, or at least have a say in matters, is both desirable and
unavoidable, according to Lewis (2013: 6): ‘The definition of borders in cyberspace
is no more a balkanisation than the existence of borders in the physical world; only
those who still believe in the one-world global commons could interpret this as
such.’ The borderless nature of cyberspace (and its governance) is a victim of the
Internet’s own success. This book argues that states will have to be facilitated in
their desire to represent their national interests in Internet governance while
ensuring that the Internet’s core infrastructure continues to operate as it should.
This chapter elaborates on this idea by placing it in an analytical framework.
Section 2.2 begins by explaining the notion of Internet governance. The literature
tends to concentrate on the broad spectrum of organisations involved, but that can
obscure what precisely needs to be governed, and why. We emphasise governance
of the various technical and socio-technical layers of the Internet, and only then
consider the organisations involved. Section 2.3 delves deeper into this subject by
drawing a distinction between ‘governance of the Internet’s architecture’ and ‘gov-
ernance using the Internet’s architecture’. It is mainly the first form of governance
that applies to the Internet as a global public good, but that public good can also be
put at risk when states initiate national policy that intervenes fundamentally in the
Internet’s architecture (i.e. governance using the Internet’s architecture).
Section 2.4 describes the model of ‘distributed security’, as a potential basis for a
foreign policy on cyberspace. This model is based on the notion of freedom as a
fundamental value and involves three principles that are intended to safeguard that
freedom – mixture, division and restraint – in the process of policymaking, and
more specifically policymaking aimed at international security. Finally, section 2.5
argues that securing the Internet as a global public good is essentially an extended
national interest.
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2.2 setting the scene:  internet governance
The Internet is governed by a coalition of formal and more informal organisations
that control certain components of access to the net, the distribution of scarce
resources (such as ip addresses), and data transmission. Much of that control is
embedded in a variety of different protocols and standards that function as the
‘rules of the road’ for Internet traffic. The system as a whole is referred to as ‘Inter-
net governance’, which Milton Mueller (2010: 9) describes as ‘the simplest, most
direct and inclusive label for the ongoing set of disputes and deliberations over
how the Internet is coordinated, managed, and shaped to reflect policies’. Because a
wide variety of different parties contribute to Internet governance, some of them
officially and others in an informal capacity, we refer to the system as a ‘multistake-
holder model’. Figure 2.1 describes some of the many actors, organisations and
forums involved in Internet governance and shows how difficult it can be to see
the wood for the trees. It is often not clear which decisions are taken where and
what role, influence and position the various stakeholders actually have in Internet
governance.
Figure 2.1 Stakeholders in the Internet ecosystem
Source: icann
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Some commentators have also noted that ‘Internet governance’ and the relevant
organisations involved in it describe only partially the forces that are actually driv-
ing the Internet’s development. Van Eeten and Mueller (2013) believe that the aca-
demic literature’s preoccupation with official organisations such as icann, the
Internet Governance Forum (igf) and the World Summit on the Information
Society (wsis) ignores other structures, issues and domains that have as much, if
not more influence on how the Internet is actually governed, for example the
economy of cybersecurity, net neutrality, content filtering and regulation, copy-
right protection, peer-to-peer file transfer, and the Interconnection Agreements
between isps. In their view (2013: 730), it is in these arenas where much of the
Internet’s actual governance takes place.
Internet governance thus seems to fit the description of multi-centred or poly-
centred governance, where there may not be a clear-cut hierarchy between the
actors (see Marks and Hooghe 2004: 21). In political terms, hierarchy scarcely plays
a role on the Internet. There is no state, business or organisation that governs the
‘the Internet’ as a whole. The protocols and standards – to which many of the
actors involved have contributed – lay down the technical laws and rules according
to which the Internet itself operates. That is why some researchers refer to ‘infra-
structure-based forms of Internet governance’ (DeNardis 2012; 2009) or a ‘regula-
tory shaping of “code” – the technologies that underpin the Internet – to achieve
more efficient outcomes’ (Brown and Marsden 2013: ix).
This book approaches Internet governance not by looking at the many organisa-
tions that concern themselves with cyberspace, but by considering, at least ini-
tially, the technical operation of the Internet, especially those parts that can be
regarded as a global public good. What we mean by ‘Internet governance’ becomes
clearer if we analyse the Internet’s architecture as a layered structure. Table 2.1
summarises four different academic views of the Internet. While the four views
agree on the essentials, they also differ on some points or emphasise other aspects.
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The layers in each column can all be reduced to three. The lowest layer encom-
passes the physical and technical infrastructure, which makes data transfer possi-
ble and is part of the global public good. The top layer is the socioeconomic layer,
where money is generated and people interact. This is the everyday face of the
Web. It is where the political battle over the Internet and what is and is not permis-
sible in its ‘public’ area is fiercest. It is not a global public good, however. Finally,
there is the middle layer, which consists of protocols, standards, codes and organi-
sations that keep the net’s hardware and deeper layer of software running, and that
states see as important for regulating cyberspace, both nationally and internation-
ally. Some parts of this layer may be regarded as part of the global public good,
whereas others may not, or to a lesser extent. The precise boundaries are difficult
to determine; everything is subject to change and opinions differ on this score.
This is the layer where engineers, businesses, international organisations and gov-
ernments battle over what should be defined as a global public good. If so defined,
it merits our special protection.
2.3 two forms of internet governance
To clarify the key elements of Internet governance, we follow Laura DeNardis
(2012; 2013; 2014). She makes a vital and very useful distinction between ‘gover-
nance of the Internet’s infrastructure’ and ‘governance using the Internet’s infra-
structure’ (DeNardis 2012: 726). Governance of the Internet’s infrastructure con-
cerns the deeper layers of the Internet and how they are organised and developed.
In other words, this is about governing the system under the bonnet, the engine
that drives the Internet’s development. It covers a number of the critical infrastruc-
tures and protocols that we can regard as a global public good. In the case of gover-
nance using the Internet’s infrastructure, the Internet is deployed as a tool in the
battle to control content on the net. The issues vary from protecting copyright and
intellectual property to government censorship and surveillance of citizens.
While such control plays a significant role in Internet governance, international
politics and the protection of human rights, it does not affect the Internet as a
global public good – at least not normally. Occasionally, however, it does – specifi-
cally when states intervene extensively in the Internet’s infrastructure for reasons
of security or other national interests.
2 . 3 . 1 g o v e r n a n c e  of  t h e  i n t e r n e t ’ s  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
The governance of the Internet’s infrastructure is concerned with the deeper layers
of the Internet, the essential technical and logical infrastructure. At its most basic,
the answer to the question ‘When is someone on the Internet?’ is ‘When that per-
son is using the Internet Protocol (ip)’. The ip is one of the crucial standards that
allow us to regard the Internet as a global public good. DeNardis (2013) lists three
areas of Internet governance that play an important role in the most basic layer.
They are (1) control over ‘Critical Internet Resources’, and especially control over
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domain names, top-level domain names and ip addresses; (2) the defining of Inter-
net standards and protocols (for example the tcp/ip protocol); and (3) the Inter-
connection agreements, which regulate and set prices for the traffic between the
various networks that make up the Internet. While these three areas of governance
also cover things that are not part of the Internet as a global public good, they are
useful as initial categories. There are also many standards and protocols that are
important to the Internet or the www but do not contribute to it as a global public
good. One of these is the infamous BitTorrent Protocol, a protocol for peer-to-peer
file sharing, which in the public’s mind has become synonymous with piracy.
While convenient, it does not affect the Internet’s core infrastructure. The ip, on
the other hand, lays down the standard that permits all participating computers to
share and exchange any type of data, contributing to the universal and non-
rivalrous nature of the net. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (http) regulates how
‘clients’, for example a search engine, communicate with ‘servers’, i.e. the comput-
ers that host a website or other content. That makes it one of the core protocols.1
As a global public good, the Internet operates properly when certain core values or
principles underpinning its functioning as a system are guaranteed. We can also
ascribe certain values to the security of the data circulating on the Internet or, put
better, the data that users circulate on the Internet. These values are summarised in
Table 2.2. Whether we trust or distrust the Internet depends on their presence or
absence.
Table 2.2 Values related to the operation of the Internet and data security











DeNardis (2013: 4) Ziewitz and Brown (2014) Singer and Friedman (2014: 35)
DeNardis (2013: 4) identifies three core values: universality, interoperability and
accessibility. They ensure that – all things being equal – the Internet operates in the
same way in The Hague as it does in New York or Bangalore. They took precedence
while the net was being developed and support the idea of it as a global public
good. Ziewitz and Brown (2014) list four design principles covering approximately
the same territory: openness, interoperability, redundancy and ‘end-to-end’
(the principle that application-specific functions ought to reside in the end hosts of
a network rather than in intermediary nodes. The network itself is neutral or
‘dumb’). The third set of values is based on the idea of data security and has three
key aims:2 confidentiality, integrity and availability (Singer and Friedman 2014: 35).
Confidentiality means being able to assume that our information and data will
remain private. Integrity means that the system and the data it contains cannot be
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altered without proper authorisation. Without integrity, in other words, we can
no longer trust the system. In cyberspace, integrity is closely linked to routing, for
example. Technically speaking, the Internet is designed so that packets of data are
always sent and routed, regardless of their content. If the Internet’s integrity is put
at risk and we no longer know whether data will arrive or may be altered en route,
we may lose confidence in the Internet and in the social and economic activities
that we now perform in cyberspace and entrust to the Internet infrastructure.
Availability is the most obvious of the three, and also touches directly on reliability
and confidence.
The three sets of values and aims are basically complementary. The core values of
the Internet and its architecture are supported by the key aims of data security.
Together they safeguard the integrity with which the Internet operates as a public
infrastructure and, in doing so, act as signposts for governing its infrastructure as a
global public good. Users trust the Internet because that infrastructure operates
properly, and that implies that the relevant governance structures also operate
properly. We define users broadly to include everyone from individuals to small
and very large public and private users. The problem is that these values are not the
specific responsibility of any one party or organisation. Basically, all the organisa-
tions involved in the governance of the Internet are responsible. That is naturally a
difficult basis from which to operate, especially now that other parties with nar-
rower political and economic interests are demanding a bigger role – whether or
not we view such demands as legitimate within the context of Internet gover-
nance. That is why we have to acknowledge the importance of these values by
adopting the more procedural perspective of ‘distributed security’, which we will
discuss in section 2.4.
2 . 3 . 2 g o v e r n a n c e  using  t h e  i n t e r n e t ’ s  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
The second form of governance attempts to regulate the conduct of individuals,
groups and businesses (‘the governed’) by using the Internet, or technical aspects
of it, as an instrument. Governance of this kind often involves matters of national
policy – restricting freedom of expression, protecting intellectual property rights
and copyright, improving security and fighting crime – using the Internet’s infra-
structure as a regulatory tool. It is difficult to regulate the public space of the Inter-
net because it is essentially a global system. At the same time, however, that global
public space also contains an identifiably national space, for example owing to lan-
guage (e.g. Dutch-language websites), domain names (e.g. .nl), and links to people,
organisations and businesses active (in this example) in the Netherlands. What
complicates regulatory matters even more is that this space is both international
and national. Few people would now claim that this public space and the people
and organisations that populate it cannot be regulated. As described in Chapter 1,
China (and many other countries) have managed to nail Bill Clinton’s Jell-O firmly
to the wall. In recent years, businesses and governments have effectively broken
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down the user anonymity which so typified the early days of cyberspace. Today,
only those who use encryption and tor (The Onion Router) or pgp (Pretty Good
Privacy) software are difficult to trace and identify online. In a world of Big Data,
cloud computing, the Internet of Things and mobile Internet, we have become
increasingly transparent and traceable. The dog in Peter Steiner’s famous 1993 car-
toon for The New Yorker (‘On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog’) is no lon-
ger quite as anonymous as he once was.
Figure 2.2 Anonymity in cyberspace, then and now
Source: The joy of tech
At the same time, much of the Internet – the ‘deep Web’ – remains uncharted terri-
tory for most users and beyond the reach of regulators. The deep Web is also popu-
lated by all sorts of black markets – including the infamous Silk Road, a platform
for selling everything from an online DDoS attack to an offline hit man, which has
now been shut down (Ablon et al. 2014). Governments have enormous difficulty
tackling cybercrime and cyberattacks, which often come from other countries
and/or the deep Web.
Spurred on by a broad spectrum of national interests, states are attempting to
intervene in the conduct of citizens, consumers and Internet users. Some do so by
interfering with or tapping into the Internet’s technical infrastructure, or through
the intermediaries that facilitate Internet access to end users (Internet Service Pro-
viders or isps) and help them navigate the Web (e.g. search engines). Law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies request or commandeer data on Google and Face-
book users in connection with criminal investigations. These companies in turn
publish transparency reports3 revealing which authorities make such requests and
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how often they do so. Usually, they are prohibited from stating precisely what
intelligence agencies have requested; in any case, it has now become obvious that
agencies do not always bother asking for permission. Governments often target
intermediaries in their attempts to control user behaviour, for example to prevent
illegal downloads or abusive behaviour and slander. Many states use Internet inter-
mediaries to spy on and censor activities of their nationals which are considered
legal in many parts of the world and which are sometimes even protected under
human rights law. isps, for example, are vital distribution points on the Internet,
making them the ideal channel for government efforts to block child pornography,
censor political opinion, and everything in between. In the realm of international
relations, this form of Internet governance touches on the vital issues of Internet
freedom and the protection of human rights in cyberspace.
Governance using the Internet’s architecture can have direct consequences for the
way the Internet operates as a system, for example when government policy impo-
ses demands on or interferes with the Internet’s core protocols and mechanisms.
In that case, national policy intended to regulate the conduct of actors on the Inter-
net also affects the core of the Internet – the global public good. A pertinent exam-
ple from the us involves two pieces of legislation, sopa and pipa, designed to
combat online piracy and protect copyright.4 Had these bills become law, they
would have intervened in the deep layer of the Domain Name System (dns),
which ‘converts’ the Web addresses that we all use (e.g. www.wrr.nl) into
addresses (80.95.169.156) that the ip recognises. These laws would have allowed
the us government to render infringing sites inaccessible, but they would have also
put the stability of the entire dns system at risk. Or, as DeNardis (2014: 8) put it:
‘The sopa/pipa legislation would have required modifications to Internet gover-
nance technologies, changes with direct implications for security and freedom’.
National policy of this kind corrodes the Internet’s core values of universality and
integrity (see also DeNardis 2013). This book looks specifically at governance that
uses the Internet’s architecture and also affects its operation as a global public
good.
2.4 freedom as the anchor: distributed security
As an international network, the Internet is best served when there is enough free-
dom (to innovate and allow communication to flow freely ) and enough security
(to prevent damage and maintain confidence in its operation). Less clear is how
policymakers can model and support freedom and security, especially at the inter-
national level. For example, the Netherlands has prioritised the freedom and secur-
ity of (and on) the Internet in various policy documents (Ministerie van Veiligheid
and Justitie 2011; 2013a; 2013b; Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2011; 2013;
Ministerie van Defensie 2012; 2013), but these values, while fundamental, are also
abstract and offer little guidance for everyday policymaking. Every country has its
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own interpretation of freedom and security, including freedom and security on
the Internet. The same is true, albeit to a lesser extent, of the core values, design
principles and key aims of the Internet as described in section 2.3.1. Although they
are more concrete than the concepts of freedom and security – and hugely signifi-
cant when it comes to public confidence in the Internet – they can only offer guid-
ance if they have the active support of the various parties involved in the Internet’s
governance structures. Once again, interests and interpretations can vary consid-
erably. This book aims to support these values at both the abstract and more opera-
tional levels by developing a procedural perspective, based on a system of ‘checks
and balances’, intended to protect the Internet’s public core.
While acknowledging the inspiring nature of these fundamental core values, we
shift the focus to a more procedural interpretation of security aimed at improving
security whilst at the same time doing everything possible to safeguard freedom.
In this regard we draw on Ronald Deibert’s ideas about distributed security (2012;
2013a; 2013b; 2014). His model focuses on improving security while simultane-
ously imposing a system of checks and balances on and between the actors charged
with state security. The liberal state is founded on the concept of freedom. Security
should restrict that freedom as little as possible.5
Distributed security emphasizes checks and balances on power, oversight on authority,
and protections for rights and freedoms. It is part of a tradition emphasizing the negation
of violence and power that is at the heart of liberal-republican theories of security going
back to ancient Greece (Deibert 2012: 16).
Deibert argues that distributed security is especially important at a time when
states are increasingly framing the Internet in terms of national security. Their nat-
ural tendency towards secrecy, the expanding influence and competences of gov-
ernment agencies responsible for national security and the often limited legal and
democratic oversight on those competences must be contained within a model
that checks that power and organises and embeds counterpower at the national and
international level. Fundamental rights and freedoms will be better protected that
way, and liberal states will be forced to develop a consistent national ideology of
security and freedom that they can then propagate abroad. The structures designed
to check and control political power on the Internet must be based on three princi-
ples (Deibert 2013a: 11-12):
• mixture: the intentional combination of multiple actors with governance roles
and responsibilities in a shared space;
• division: a design principle that no one of these actors is able to control the
space in question without the cooperation and consent of others;
• restraint: reinforcement of restraint on power, including checks and balances
on governments, law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
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These archetypal principles of the constitutional state draw on the age-old tradi-
tion of the separation of powers and power-sharing as developed in the Roman
Empire and by the founding fathers of the United States. In a national context,
they are easy to identify. The traditional ideal is the separation of powers or
power-sharing between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of govern-
ment, although it is seldom perfect even at the national level. Forms of oversight,
accountability and shared responsibility for policy domains are further examples
of division, mixture and restraint. The national context differs substantially from
the international arena, however. International politics do not take place in a
closed political system with a formal division of power, nor is it a democratic con-
stitutional system with a defined citizenry, elected representatives, a government
and a judiciary. That does not mean that it is bereft of laws; there are treaties, there
is international law, and there are international and regional courts and tribunals
whose rulings are binding. The point, however, is that there is no authority that
consistently and systematically monitors compliance with these laws – although
ad hoc coalitions, some deriving their political support and legitimacy from the
United Nations, may enforce or oversee some rules and resolutions. International
relations are based on the territorial integrity of sovereign national states. The
Internet, a horizontal and global phenomenon, challenges this notion.
Interestingly enough, the current system of Internet governance already encom-
passes a number of elements consistent with the model of distributed security and
its underlying principles of division, mixture and restraint. Specifically, these prin-
ciples to some extent underpin the more technical aspects of Internet governance.
Mueller et al. (2013) describe the technical community as cooperating non-hier-
archically and voluntarily to solve Internet problems of the most serious kind,
including cybersecurity threats (e.g. botnets and malware) or even issues affecting
routing and other central processes. In that sense, the technical community is what
Haas (1992) has described as an ‘epistemic community’: ‘a network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authori-
tative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.
This is why Deibert believes in boosting these peer-to-peer communities and
offering them firmer guarantees under a system of distributed security. However,
that runs contrary to current tendencies: ‘The general trend is towards more state
involvement, hybrid forms of networked-hierarchical practices, growing secrecy,
and politicization of technical standards’ (Deibert 2014: 50).
Distributed security also connects the national level to the international; after all,
‘a country cannot lament the loss of rights and freedoms internationally when
those very rights and freedoms are being eroded at home’ (Deibert 2012: 17).
The most obvious example is the us’s loss of moral leadership in the realm of
Internet governance following revelations about the nsa’s surveillance pro-
grammes (Greenwald 2014). The Snowden and Manning leaks have been detri-
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mental to the us and they have also cast a shadow on the ‘Western camp’ in Inter-
net governance matters, causing its members to question whether they actually
share the same views on freedom and security. Besides the surveillance and
espionage issue itself, this nervousness has therefore also impaired the Western
international efforts and position at a crucial time, when many countries are
choosing sides in matters of Internet governance. But the link between the
national and international levels can also come in a very different guise. The preoc-
cupation with cybersecurity is a modern-day, digital version of an old problem in
international politics, known as the security dilemma. According to Jervis (1978:
169), a security dilemma exists when ‘many of the means by which a state tries to
increase its security decrease the security of others’. And how those others react to
their decreased security can, in turn, decrease the security of the first state. Ulti-
mately, a digital arms race may decrease the security of all, not to mention of the
Internet itself. In Deibert’s view, the principle of restraint is most at risk and
should therefore receive the most attention in foreign policy.
2.5 conclusion: internet governance and extended
national interests
Many countries in the world, at various stages of economic development, share a
vital interest in a free, open and secure Internet. A number of the features that have
led to the Internet’s success and growth must furthermore be safeguarded and pro-
tected where necessary. As discussed earlier, some of the Internet’s core compo-
nents can be regarded as a global public good and warrant international protection.
As a public resource, an open Internet is so beneficial to countries with an open
economy and international outlook that it should be considered an ‘extended
national interest’. This term was coined by the Dutch Scientific Council for Gov-
ernment Policy (wrr) in 2010 to describe those areas where national interests
align with strategic global issues that can be defined as global public goods.
This provides a good starting point for a national diplomatic agenda on Internet
governance. Governments need to explore (a) how global public goods relate to
their national interests and those of their citizens; (b) where the most substantial
interfaces between global public goods and national interests are located; and
(c) how and how much governments would be willing and prepared to contribute
to safeguarding such global public goods (Knapen et al. 2011: 47).
In the realm of Internet governance, a useful first step would be to draw an analyti-
cal distinction between ‘governance of the Internet’ and ‘governance using the
Internet’. Governance of the Internet is intended to safeguard those parts of the
Internet that are part of the global public good, regulating its deep technological
and logical layers and preventing states seeking to secure their national interests in
cyberspace from impacting on the Internet’s fundamental protocols and infra-
structures in the process. The deep layers that embody the collective nature of the
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Internet have become all the more vulnerable with the encroaching securitisation
of cyberspace and states’ demands to play a greater role in Internet governance.
National policy can cause disruptions that eat away at the universality, inter-
operability and accessibility of the Internet as a whole (DeNardis 2014) or endanger
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the Internet as an information sys-
tem (Singer and Friedman 2014). Such disruptions will undermine the Internet as a
global public good and the digital substructure of much of our economy and soci-
ety today. The values and principles reviewed above must be combined with a pro-
cedural outlook that can help us determine the future of Internet governance.
Our suggestion is to apply the model of distributed security to Internet gover-
nance. This model improves security while imposing a system of checks and bal-
ances on and between the actors charged with state security. To safeguard freedom
– the concept underpinning the liberal tradition on which distributed security is
based – we must apply the principles of mixture, division and restraint as much as
possible in designing a system and practice of Internet governance. These princi-
ples can ensure that power is shared, restrained, transparent, and made subject to
oversight.
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notes
1 The core protocols are sometimes grouped together under the label tcp/ip. In that case, they
also include the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (smtp), the File Transfer Protocol (ftp) and
the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (http) (DeNardis 2014: 67).
2 Also referred to as the cia triad: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.
3 See for example: http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ and https://www.
facebook.com/about/government_requests.
4 sopa stands for the Stop Online Piracy Act and pipa for the Protect Intellectual Property Act.
Both have been withdrawn, probably for good.
5 Or, as Bauman et al. (2014: 139) put it: ‘The liberal example is one of security through liberty,
not security at the expense of liberty’.
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3 governance of the public internet
Internet governance functions have been around for far longer than the term Internet
governance.
Laura DeNardis (2009: 13)
3.1 the internet as a global public good
The Internet’s public core embodies a number of abstract values. Universality,
interoperability, accessibility, integrity, availability and confidentiality are the core
values that guarantee ‘the Internet’ as a global system. In essence, they are about
functionalities. Although rather ethereal in nature, the impact of this core is very
practical in some respects. That is because the task of upholding these values and
functions has been entrusted to institutions, protocols and standards that support
and guarantee the core public infrastructure of the Internet. This chapter is about
those institutions, protocols and standards, and about new issues that have arisen
within that context in the wake of technological, economic and political change.
As the above quote by DeNardis (2009: 13) makes clear, Internet governance pre-
dates the term itself by many years. In the short history of cyberspace, however,
that governance has changed and professionalised considerably. The paper note-
book in which Internet pioneer Jon Postel kept a list of who had been assigned
which ip address was replaced long ago by icann, a professional organisation that
now administers the almost four billion ip addresses issued since those early days.
icann, which acts as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (iana), has
become controversial and a fierce debate is raging as to whether this particular
organisation is the best candidate to perform this critical Internet governance func-
tion. In other words, while a particular solution may have made sense in the past, it
is not necessarily the best choice in the present or future. As long as the values
underpinning the Internet are safeguarded, the question of who performs a given
function is less important than that it is actually performed. The Internet’s growth
has created governance problems that go far beyond the need to replace Jon Postel’s
notebook. Some of these are technical and related to the growth of the network
itself (for example the need to update the Internet Protocol from version 4 to ver-
sion 6). Other problems have found their way onto the agenda because the Inter-
net’s growing economic and political significance has attracted new parties and
stakeholders, some of which meddle in the technical operation and management
of its public core. Engineers now find that other parties – parties with economic
and political or geopolitical interests – are taking an interest in the operation of the
net, leading to mounting tension in some areas.
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Basing ourselves on the terminology used in Chapter 2, we speak of the gover-
nance of the Internet’s infrastructure when referring to the core of the Internet as a
public good. Although it is not always clear what that core encompasses, there is
no question that certain protocols and functions belong to the global public good
of the Internet. Those protocols and functions are managed by a number of organi-
sations. This ‘Team Internet’ – which consists of both the organisations and the
protocols themselves – is highly efficient and effective in many ways, but falls
short in others. Its shortcomings may be related to design flaws and technical inca-
pacity, but also to political and economic pressures, stakeholder interests and
questions of legitimacy. Section 3.2 begins by describing Team Internet. It explains
what belongs to the public core of the Internet and which organisations manage
and operate it. It also briefly reviews the achievements of Team Internet in terms of
network growth, numbers of users, and social and economic wealth that has been
built on the Internet’s backbone. Section 3.3 reviews four major controversies
about the governance of the public Internet. Such conflicts are more likely to have
been caused by shifts in international political and/or economic relations than by
dissatisfaction about the technical operation of the Internet.
3.2 team internet:  stewards of the internet’s core
We can look at the governance of the Internet as a global public good in various
ways. If we view it in terms of people and organisations, then its governance lies
with those who develop, administer and operate the public core of the Internet.
If we view it in terms of technology, then the protocols and standards – and in
some cases the technical infrastructure – are important to governance. These func-
tions and roles obviously overlap on some points. The point is that ‘Team Internet’
is made up of many different people and organisations – most of them active in the
private sector and/or civil society, a minority in government – and of technical
standards and protocols. Those protocols may well be technical or logical in nature,
but that does not make them immune to interests, politics and power (DeNardis
2009; 2014; Mueller 2009; 2012; Brown and Marsden 2013). For every protocol that
has been promoted to the status of a standard, there were alternatives that did not
succeed for one reason or another. Software and protocols have a huge regulatory
impact. ‘Code is law’, as Lessig (1999; 2006) put it. Politics and other manifesta-
tions of power do matter, and may be embedded right into the code and protocols
themselves.1
The developers tend to be loosely organised groups of people and organisations
that produce and discuss the software protocols and standards and finally ‘elevate’
them to standards. The quotation marks around this word indicate that it is ulti-
mately worldwide acceptance that turns a protocol into a genuine standard.
The key developers are the Internet Engineering Task Force (ietf), the Internet
Society (isoc), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and similar organisa-
46 t h e  p u b l i c  c o r e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n e t
tions in which renowned, independent ‘netheads’ such as Vint Cerf and Tim
Berners-Lee originally led the pack (Brown and Marsden 2013: 12). They come up
with ideas for protocols and standards that regulate data transfer, interoperability,
interconnection and routing between networks, and the format of the data trans-
mitted across the Internet. ietf, for example, came up with the Internet Protocol,
http and html, which were later adopted by its partner W3C. These and a few
other organisations constitute what is known in Internet terminology as the ‘tech-
nical community’. They are relatively open in structure. For example, anyone can
basically attend ietf meetings. They also clearly operate more in the private sector
than in the public, and they have a huge impact on the protocols and standards that
constitute the Internet’s core.
The work of these developers provides the logical building blocks of the Internet
itself, i.e. the protocols and standards that keep the Internet running and route data
so that it reaches all corners of the world. The most important protocols are known
collectively as the tcp/ip Protocol Suite. The Transmission Control Protocol (tcp)
and the Internet Protocol (ip) are at the very heart of this suite. Without them, the
net will not operate. The protocols in the tcp/ip Protocol Suite are divided into
four layers: the link layer, the Internet layer, the transport layer and the application
layer. Figure 3.1 lists the core protocols in each layer.
Figure 3.1 The tcp/ip Protocol Suite
4. APPLICATION LAYER
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
Domain Name System (DNS)
Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP)
File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
3. TRANSPORT LAYER
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
2. INTERNET LAYER
Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4)
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
1. LINK LAYER
Ethernet
Address resolution Protocol (ARP)
Synchronous Optical Network (SONET)
APPLICATION
NETWORK HARDWARE
Source: Adapted from DeNardis 2009: 8
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Each layer in the model plays a crucial role in communication over the Internet.
The application layer contains digital data in a form that ‘ordinary’ people can
comprehend, such as text and numbers. The two layers below this – transport and
Internet – regulate the way information is converted into bits and bytes and divi-
ded into packets that are transmitted over the Internet’s networks. The link layer
ensures that data can move across the entire net, regardless of the hardware con-
nection (i.e. wireless or cable). As its name implies, the Internet Protocol or ip is
the most crucial protocol for the operation of the Internet. The layered model is
sometimes depicted as an hourglass, with ip as the narrowest part. The protocols
in the other layers function as alternatives for each other (transport is possible via
tcp and udp) but the Internet layer only operates via ip, at least at the present time
(DeNardis 2009: 9). All these protocols are vital to the Internet’s operation in their
own way, but a few of them stand out within the context of this study because
they (a) embody certain values that underpin the Internet as a global public good
and/or (b) have been targeted by private parties and, specifically, by states as chan-
nels for controlling the Internet or for exercising control using the Internet.
The main targets are tcp/ip and dns because they generate the Internet’s most
critical resources, i.e. the Internet addresses that facilitate communication and the
domain names for Websites. These ‘Critical Internet Resources’ (cirs) are ‘virtual,
Internet specific, globally unique resources rather than physical architecture or vir-
tual resources not specific to the Internet’ (DeNardis 2014: 36).
Before tcp/ip was elevated to a standard, devices manufactured by ibm, for exam-
ple, could not communicate with those manufactured by Apple. tcp/ip lays down
the standard for data transport and requires every device that sends and/or
receives information over the Internet to have a device or session-specific ip
address (a unique number). Without this address, data cannot be sent or received.
During transmission, tcp/ip breaks the data down into small packets and adds a
header containing the source and destination ip addresses and the correct packet
sequence. The packets take different routes through the networks that together
constitute ‘the Internet’ and are only reassembled in the correct order when they
have arrived at their final destination. The network (the routers, the Internet Serv-
ice Providers) does not review the packet content but is only concerned with iden-
tifying the most efficient route, depending on the degree of network congestion.
This is known as the end-to-end principle, which, in its most extreme form, con-
siders the network to be ‘dumb’. The principle states that data content and data
processing ought to reside in the end hosts of a network, i.e. the computers of the
sender and receiver. The network itself is neutral, or ‘dumb’, and merely relays the
data. Or, as the technical community explained in The Architectural Principles of
the Internet: ‘the goal is interconnectivity, the tool is the Internet Protocol, and the
intelligence is end to end rather than hidden in the network’ (cited in Ziewitz and
Brown 2014).
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Critical Internet Resources
ip addresses are critical Internet resources because they make it possible for two
unique users to communicate. Since ip addresses are unintelligible to ordinary
users and difficult to memorise, the pioneers of the Internet introduced domain
names. A domain name, for example www.wrr.nl, represents the user’s ip address,
which remains invisible. This means that domain names must also be unique and
can only be issued once to a single person or organisation. Certain domain names
are obviously extremely valuable. The Coca Cola Company is very keen to own
www.cocacola.com, www.cocacola.nl and other such domain names because they
are logical places that people interested in Coca Cola will seek out. The task of issu-
ing domain names is entrusted to a hierarchical structure made up largely of pri-
vate organisations. At the top of the pile is icann, a ‘non-profit public benefit cor-
poration’ incorporated under the laws of California. icann manages the root zone
(the ‘dot’ in a Web address) and issues the top-level domain names, the broadest
category to which websites are assigned (the letters to the right of the dot). These
can be either generic top-level domains (tld) such as .com or .org, or a country-
code tld such as .nl. The tlds are entered into registries. The us company Veri-
sign, for example, administers the generic tld ‘.com’ registry, while the Dutch
company sidn does the same for the country-code tld ‘.nl’. The next level down
are the ‘registrars’, businesses and organisations authorised to sell names to cus-
tomers within a specific domain. The hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.2.















Mueller (2002: 2-6) stresses that the importance and value of domain names and ip
addresses – which lie at the core of the Internet’s operation – may be conceptual-
ised in two different ways. If they are handled poorly, the Internet could ‘break’,
but at the same time they have been turned into marketable commodities that can
even be worth a lot of money. In other words, they are critical to the Internet’s
operation as a global public good, but they also have an economic and political
value. This means that economic and political interests figure in the debate. These
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critical Internet resources are created by issuing new domain names and ip
addresses. Their administration consists of registering ip addresses and domain
names, updating the registry and making it accessible to the public. icann is the
top organisation in both respects (issuing and administration). It is the only organ-
isation authorised to create new top-level domain names (for exam-
ple .apple, .shop and .xxx) and to manage the root of the Domain Name System
(dns). icann – under a contractual relationship with the us Department of Com-
merce – is responsible for issuing ip addresses (one of the iana functions), which
they allocate in large blocks to five regional organisations (Regional Internet Regis-
tries, rirs); see Figure 3.3. The rirs in turn allocate smaller blocks of ip addresses
to local registries; they in turn distribute these blocks to Internet Service Providers
and, finally, to end users. Some regions are running out of ip addresses. To address
this problem, Team Internet decided in 1995 to develop and launch a new version
of the Internet Protocol (ip version 6 or ipv6), which has an almost infinite number
of addresses. The transition to ipv6 has been slow, however; it involves making
changes deep in the Internet’s core infrastructure and all around the world.
Figure 3.3 rir allocation of ip addresses
Source: arin
Domain names must be unique so that the packets of data sent over the Internet
reach the correct destination. They must also be linked to an ip address. That pro-
cess is managed by the dns. DeNardis (2014: 41) describes it this way: ‘The dns is a
look-up system that handles billions upon billions of queries per day locating
requested Internet resources. It is an enormous database management system
(dbms) distributed internationally across numerous servers with the purpose of
providing the locations of resources such as a website, email address, or file’.
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An international network of ‘root’ servers – a disproportionate number of them
located in the us and Europe – ensures that the data packets arrive at the appropri-
ate destination. The operation of the Internet thus depends on a dns that is consis-
tent and accurate.
Operators: Internet exchanges, certs and isps
In addition to the core infrastructure of protocols, standards and organisations,
there are many other components that play a vital role in facilitating Internet traffic
as we know it. Without Internet exchanges such as ams-ix in the Netherlands and
the undersea cables that link the continents, worldwide communication would be
impossible. Routing agreements between the various networks that collectively
make up the Internet govern how data move across the world. And the various
public, private and mixed Computer Emergency Response Teams (certs) work to
keep the local, regional and international Internet healthy by battling Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, viruses and malware. Internet Service Providers
or isps are usually the most direct link between users and the Internet. They give
users access to the Internet and often provide other services, for example domain
name registration, e-mail services or website hosting. As a vital link in the Inter-
net’s socioeconomic domain, isps are also often the go-to organisations to facili-
tate and execute interventions in the online world for political (law enforcement,
censorship, security) and economic (copyright) reasons.
3 . 2 . 1 t h e  o v e r w h e l m i n g  s u c c e s s  o f  t e a m  i n t e r n e t
Team Internet has a fantastic track record when it comes to the Internet’s growth.
As mentioned earlier, we can scarcely imagine our social, cultural and economic
lives now without the Internet. It is a fundamental and ever-expanding part of our
economy and society, with ‘our’ digital society now being as tightly interwoven
with the rest of the world as the Internet itself. Everyday life will only grow more
closely intertwined with the Internet in the years ahead, especially as cloud com-
puting and the ‘Internet of Things’ gather momentum. Storing data in the cloud
severs their bond with a specific territory and location, while the Internet of
Things will link our homes, our cars, our appliances and even our bodies to the
Internet. Cyberspace has expanded in a multitude of different directions by mak-
ing use of infrastructures, both existing (telephone, cable) and new (optical fibre
and wireless networks). Governments have often played a vital role in that pro-
cess, but in all other ways the Internet has developed without much government
intervention into a network capable of accommodating virtually every new user,
application and innovation. According to Zittrain (2008), it is precisely the open
nature of the Internet – its open standards and protocols, which lower the thresh-
old for anyone with promising new ideas – that have allowed it and everything that
depends on it to thrive. Statistics on the number of users and websites and the
online economy speak volumes about the success of a network that had such hum-
ble beginnings.
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The Internet as a whole is often described as a ‘best effort network’. This means
that the interaction between the various component networks and providers com-
bined with the basic protocols render the best service possible by making efficient
use of the available bandwidth, but without guaranteeing a specific level of quality
in advance. ‘The Internet’ does its best, but there are no guarantees. It is primarily
the increase in bandwidth that has fuelled the growth of the Internet, especially as
the number of bits and bytes being transmitted across the net has increased expo-
nentially in recent years as its use has expanded. Text on the Internet has now been
eclipsed entirely by photographs, music, videos and streaming, causing the pres-
sure on the net to increase exponentially. By way of illustration: Netflix and You-
Tube – currently the two most popular streaming sites – are responsible for almost
half the peak Internet traffic in the us (Anders 2014). Some have referred to the
recent precipitous rise in available data as the ‘data revolution’ (Kitchin 2014). In
2012, ibm estimated that 90 percent of the data available worldwide had been cre-
ated in the preceding two years. Numerous reports and analyses concur that the
volume of data generated worldwide has increased exponentially and will con-
tinue to do so (Kitchin 2014: 69-72). Much of it is generated on or by the Internet,
and/or is transmitted across the network. Team Internet’s greatest achievement is
that so far, cyberspace has been able to accommodate this tremendous growth
without either imploding or exploding. However, the Internet’s success has also
made it more interesting for economic and political stakeholders. This means that
the engineers are now finding that other parties – parties with economic and polit-
ical interests – are taking a major interest in the Internet and its operation.
3.3 problems in the governance of the internet as a
global public good
The governance of the Internet has run into problems over time. For example, its
exponential growth led to the ipv4 exhaustion problem. Moreover, technological
advances such as Deep Packet Inspection (dpi) create new opportunities to moni-
tor data traffic, and conflicting political and economic interests lead to debates
about how ip addresses and domain names should be issued and administered.
Opinions about cybersecurity are also changing. In all these instances, the techni-
cal approach of Team Internet is often at loggerheads with the political and eco-
nomic interests of other parties. Even the introduction of ipv6 – on the face of it,
purely a technical update – has become bogged down in economic interests and
political impasses. These debates can be viewed in different ways, but can also be
framed as a conflict between the collective significance of the Internet as a global
public good versus more narrowly defined national, political or economic inter-
ests. We briefly discuss four of these debates below. Our object is to distinguish the
collective infrastructure of the global public good – which must not become the
plaything of national political interests – from those aspects of the debate which,
whether we like it or not, have an inherently political component. The debates are
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(1) the collective problem of updating the Internet Protocol to version 6; (2) the
discussion concerning stewardship of the iana functions and the controversial
role and position of icann; (3) the debate about Deep Packet Inspection and net
neutrality; and (4) the discourse about changing attitudes towards cybersecurity
and how it should be tackled.
3 . 3 . 1 a  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  p r o b l e m :  t h e  ( n o n - ) a d o p t i o n  o f  i p v 6
The Internet’s growth is based on a stock of available ip addresses that can hook up
new users and applications to cyberspace. Of course, that means that there has to
be a plentiful supply of such addresses. The current protocol, ipv4, is running out
of steam, even though its inventors were visionary enough to create roughly four
billion unique ip addresses at a time when there were only a few thousand users.
icann, as the Internet Assigned Names Authority or iana, allocated the last four
blocks of ipv4 addresses in 2011. Two regions, ripe-ncc (Europe) and apnic
(Asia), have already exhausted their entire allotment of ipv4 addresses (oecd
2014a: 14) and are facing an acute shortage. The transition to the latest protocol,
ipv6, has been slow, however. The new protocol would immediately solve the
exhaustion problem because it provides for the creation of 340 undecillion unique
ip addresses (3.4×1038). Although the technical community had warned about ipv4
exhaustion as far back as 1990 and the new ipv6 standard was already available in
the decade that followed (DeNardis 2009), the adoption of ipv6 has been lamenta-
bly slow. Belgium (29%) and the us (10.2%) are in the lead; a handful of countries
have an adoption rate of between 3 percent and 10 percent, and the rest lag far
behind, with 0 percent adoption being common in some parts of the world.2 The
biggest problem is that ipv6 does not have ‘backward compatibility’ with ipv4. In
other words, until everything and everyone has transitioned to ipv6, we all need to
maintain two ip addresses to guarantee the reception of data. That makes ipv6
adoption a collective action problem. Those who are unable to obtain ipv4
addresses because the stock in their region has been exhausted will benefit from
ipv6 adoption, but to communicate globally, they have to depend on other users
adopting the new protocol as well – including users who can still obtain ipv4
addresses. The transition is also expensive and requires an investment on the part
of isps without giving them a ‘first-mover advantage’, since issuing ipv6 addresses
does not give their existing customers any noticeable extras.
DeNardis (2014: 81) explains this less than ideal situation as the outcome of the
technical community’s culture and strong sense of solidarity: ‘Although retrospec-
tively this seems like a design problem, at the time ipv6 was selected, the assump-
tion was that Internet users would want to upgrade for the network’s overall
good’. But today’s billions of Internet users no longer feel that solidarity.
Others point out that the ipv4 format simply did not have the space to accommo-
date a compatible extension.3 Today, along with the upgrade to ipv6 – which as
stated is proceeding extremely sluggishly, although some believe that is changing
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(Czyz et al. 2013) – an international market has emerged for ipv4 addresses that
have been allocated but not yet used (Mueller and Kuerbis 2013). The non-transi-
tion to ipv6, the trade in ipv4 addresses and the persistent use of technical tricks
(middleware) allowing multiple users to ‘share’ a single ip address are affecting the
stability of the Internet and leading to fragmentation. Governments are also grow-
ing nervous about the non-transition to ipv6 because it could seriously damage the
Internet economy, but they can do nothing to speed up or force the changeover
(oecd 2014a: 7). All they can really do is plead and offer incentives, as the oecd
did in its Seoul Declaration for the Future of the Internet Economy: ‘Encourage the
adoption of the new version of the Internet Protocol (ipv6), in particular through
its timely adoption by governments as well as large private sector users of ipv4
addresses, in view of the ongoing ipv4 depletion.’
3 . 3 . 2 i s s u i n g  a n d  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  i p  a d d r e s s e s  a n d  d o m a i n  n a m e s
ip addresses and domain names are issued and administered by the Internet Cor-
poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (icann), a us non-profit public bene-
fit corporation. icann was assigned these tasks – known as iana functions – by
the us government, which had funded the management of the Domain Name Sys-
tem (dns) until then. Its decision has long been disputed because the contractual
relationship between icann and the us Department of Commerce allows the gov-
ernment of the United States to influence the allocation of ip addresses and
domain names, the Critical Internet Resources. Edward Snowden’s recent revela-
tions have damaged the us government’s credibility as the guardian of a free Inter-
net and added fuel to this debate. It has led to even more vigorous calls to alter a
system in which icann and the us government play such a vital role. In March
2014, the us government itself opened the door to change by announcing its inten-
tion to end its relationship with icann in its present form. This was not the first
time that the United States had made such an announcement, however. In the pre-
vious instance, it ended up simply renewing its contract with icann and nothing
changed. Opinions are sharply divided about the us’s announcement. Some com-
mentators claim that President Obama is putting the Internet up for grabs and
placing us national security at risk; others believe that other forms of oversight of
the iana functions could be equally effective (Zittrain 2014).
The discussion goes back much further than that, however. Many countries look
askance at the us’s privileged position in the management of what can be regarded
as a global public good. Roughly speaking, there are two camps that wish to reform
icann, or rather, oversight of the iana functions pertaining to the allocation and
administration of domain names and ip addresses. The first camp consists of the
multilateralists, known in the Internet community as the proponents of ‘multi-
stakeholderism’. They believe that the best way to guarantee the future of the
Internet is to place the management of its critical resources in the hands of a broad
coalition of individuals, organisations, civil society, businesses and authorities.
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The other camp consists of the nationalists, who want to alter the governance of
the Internet to give states more control and authority over their ‘own national
Internet’. The first camp is mainly made up of people and organisations that popu-
late the ‘Internet community’. Many states also support the idea of multistake-
holderism, though few of them would surrender their own (growing) influence
entirely. Indeed, states are loath to let others have a say in what goes into official
declarations and conventions on Internet governance, and ngos consequently
have only indirect and limited input into such matters (Cogburn 2010; Dutton and
Peltu 2010). The second camp is headed by authoritarian states aiming to exercise
the same control over their populations online as they do offline.
Figure 3.4 Signatories and non-signatories to the International Telecommunications
Regulations, 2012
Source: Techdirt.com
The two camps fought over control of the Internet’s ‘names and numbers’ through
many different rounds without making any headway. That changed in 2012 during
the World Conference on International Telecommunications (wcit) in Dubai,
when un member states gathered to negotiate a new telecommunications treaty
(the International Telecommunications Regulations, or itrs) under the auspices of
the un’s International Telecommunication Union (itu). The new agreement,
which many analysts believe opens the door to the balkanisation of the Internet,
made it patently clear that the world is sharply divided on the subject of Internet
governance: 89 states, including China, Russia and many Arab states, signed the
new treaty, while 55 states, including the us, the eu member states, most other
oecd members and countries such as Mongolia, India and Peru, refused to sign
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and openly resisted the agreement. Figure 3.4, which is based on the itu’s own
data, reveals how the world is divided on this point. The countries in red are those
that refused to sign the new itrs, and the countries in black are those that did sign.
The votes of the countries shown in grey were not officially recorded for various
reasons, for example failure to pay membership dues.
From a diplomatic perspective, it should be noted that the future of this debate
does not lie with the countries at the opposite ends of the spectrum – they are
unlikely to waver in their positions – but with the states in the middle.
These ‘swing states’ or ‘fence-sitters’ are often well aware of the importance of
internet governance issues and are emerging players at the international level
(Maurer and Morgus 2014). Even in a well-integrated regional organisation such as
the eu, member states do not agree on some points, and differ considerably in
terms of know-how, strategy and even policy in cyber issues. Diplomatic efforts
should therefore zero in on the countries with ‘swing’ potential. From all appear-
ances, this is the time to forge new coalitions to complement existing ones. This is
especially urgent given that the icann debate – while the best-known and most
symbolic discussion on Internet governance – is unlikely to be the last debate to
focus on the future of the Internet or its component parts.
As mentioned earlier, the Snowden leaks have dented the moral leadership of the
us, something that has become very obvious in the icann debate. In April 2014,
Brazil – one of the countries whose top officials had been targeted by the nsa –
convened the two-day NetMundial meeting in São Paulo. Dismay over the Snow-
den revelations dominated the meeting, whose final resolution vigorously advoca-
ted the multistakeholder model for Internet governance. NetMundial boosted the
search for a new way to truly globalise the tasks of icann without putting the sta-
bility of the net at risk. All sorts of parties have now joined the discussion.
The European Commission, for example, stated in a Communication (2014) that it
supported a ‘genuine multistakeholder approach for Internet governance’, arguing
explicitly that contracts concerning domain names and ip addresses should not
need to be concluded under California law. At times, typical state traditions resur-
face in proposals. The French Senate, for example, joined in the debate in July 2014
by issuing a lengthy report on the future of Internet governance. The report makes
far-reaching recommendations to transform icann into W(orld)icann, make it
subject to international rather than California law, and accountable to a World
Internet Council whose members would be appointed by the un member states
(Sénat Français 2014). Some of these proposals were designed to increase the eu’s
influence in international Internet governance. While France’s suggestion of
replacing the political influence of a single state – the United States – by a multilat-
eral executive is certainly an improvement, the proposal is also vulnerable to a pol-
icy of divide and conquer by states that would rather nationalise than internation-
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alise the Internet. Despite the report’s many references to the multistakeholder
model, the French proposal to set up a political council would mainly end up
increasing the power of states in Internet governance.
Many commentators see the icann debate as symbolic (see e.g. Zittrain 2014).
icann has not really ‘done that much wrong’, and in fact has only two tasks rela-
ted to the operation of the Internet (although they are crucial ones). The first task
concerns the iana functions, which roughly means administering the register of
domain names and ip addresses and updating and maintaining the dns (also
known as root zone management). The second task is to expand and ‘market’ new
top level domains (tlds). This distinction leads Mueller and Kuerbis (2014) to
draw an important conclusion: political interference in the first task should be kept
to an absolute minimum, since it basically consists of technical and operational
work. The second task is much more ‘political’ in nature. It involves determining
which domain names are acceptable, how many ip addresses are required, and who
or what should administer them. How the second task should be handled politi-
cally is a matter of preference and a sensitive issue, but it is – or should be – beyond
dispute that the first task must remain outside the realm of political wrangling and
influence so as to ensure the integrity and consistency of the technical system.
Or, as Muller and Kuerbis (2014) put it: ‘Many observers of the iana controversy
believe that root zone management is an appropriate site for public oversight and
policy intervention. This is a mistake’. The iana stewardship transition thus
requires states to exercise the necessary restraint.
3 . 3 . 3 n e t  n e u t r a l i t y
The third debate that touches on the Internet’s technical operation concerns net
neutrality. Net neutrality is the principle that all data transmitted over a network
should be treated equally. It is related to the end-to-end principle, based on the
idea of a neutral or ‘dumb’ network that simply passes along data as it receives
them. Net neutrality is a principle – the default setting for the ip and the Internet –
and not an established protocol. The main question is whether an isp (operating
one of the networks that together comprise the Internet) may differentiate
between different types of data that pass through its network by blocking, thrott-
ling or, conversely, prioritising it. Since net neutrality is mainly concerned with
the speed at which data reach the end user – in most cases, the customer (the so-
called last mile access) – it is often a regional or even national issue. Nevertheless, it
is a point of concern in a host of different countries, has led to fiery debates in
national and European political arenas, and influences how the Internet is per-
ceived, how data traffic is handled, and how money is made on the Internet.
A critical point in the net neutrality debate is whether network operators are capa-
ble of inspecting data packet content. Without that capability, they cannot mean-
ingfully distinguish one packet from another. For a long time, it was technically
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impossible to scan the content of passing packets in real time, but Deep Packet
Inspection (dpi) and other technological advances have changed that. Network
operators are now able to scan packet content and – if they so desire – to slow down
or block their passage based on the type of application, the protocol used (such as
the BitTorrent protocol, which is associated with piracy), the user or the content
(DeNardis 2014: 135). There may be many reasons for wanting to do so, including
network management or security considerations, and all sorts of political and eco-
nomic arguments in favour of blocking or pricing content. Net neutrality is one of
the founding principles of the Internet, making it an article of faith for many who
are involved in the discussion. It is bound up with the idea of the Internet as a place
free of politics. In that sense, as DeNardis (2014: 149) argues, ‘net neutrality is not
neutral but represents a set of values. Many of these are historical values embedded
in the design of the Internet’s architecture, such as engineering user choice about
what information to access and creating a level playing field for the introduction of
new information products’.
Three different logics intertwine in the debate about net neutrality. The first is a
technical logic that is concerned with network management and quality of service;
the second is an economic logic that relates to revenue models in cyberspace and
the answer(s) to the question ‘What is a level playing field?’; and the third is a
political logic about using dpi to facilitate political control and censorship on isp
networks. A study by Asghari et al. (2013) on isp use of dpi worldwide shows that
dpi is common but amenable to regulation. It is more unusual in countries with
strong opinions and strict laws on privacy, and more commonplace in those with a
tradition of censorship. dpi use for network management purposes is less contro-
versial but is also not very clearly defined.4 There are good and legitimate reasons
to differentiate between data streams and ensure that the network offers the
majority of users maximum quality. It is difficult enough to draw the line between
legitimate network management and violations of net neutrality – a concept that
has also not been clearly defined – but even harder when economic or political
motives start to play a role.
Since the Internet is a network of largely private networks (isps), various economic
interests play a role. The two that are most in competition with each other are isps
and providers of digital services. That may be because such providers introduce
new services that rival the core tasks of the isps, many of which have merged activ-
ities in different branches into a single company. Wearing its isp hat, for example,
the Netherlands’ former state-owned telephone company kpn must be less than
pleased to handle calls made on Skype, which competes directly with its telephony
services. In the opposite corner are Internet-based services and businesses; the
most successful of these, whether it be Netflix or Facebook, are huge traffickers of
data. The process of uploading photographs and film clips and streaming videos
takes an enormous chunk out of the bandwidth that network operators use to
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‘guarantee’ the quality of the connection for all their users. Network operators
would like to charge Netflix and other digital service providers extra in exchange
for guaranteed, priority treatment of their data streams. Both users and Internet
businesses object to this idea, however. Users are afraid that prioritisation will
slow down traffic on the rest of the Internet, while businesses think that isps
should simply get on with their work and optimise data transmission across the
board. In addition, it is the users who pay the isps for data use, not the providers of
Internet services.5 One frequently heard argument in this connection to net neu-
trality debates concerns innovation and the level playing field. If the Internet were
to consist largely of private highways paid for by the Googles, Netflixes and Face-
books of this world, how could any new innovative company grow and succeed on
the slow-moving secondary roads that remain? A start-up would no longer have
the same opportunities that Google had when it started out. But the isps want to
see more incentives and compensation to cover the costly investments needed to
meet the ever-expanding appetite for bandwidth. They would rather get big com-
panies to cover these investments than their own customers, who may react by
taking their business to the competition.
Policymakers sometimes align themselves with the net neutrality camp.
The Netherlands and Slovenia, for example, have codified the principle of net neu-
trality. The eu is discussing a new Regulation governing the single market for tele-
communications,6 but whether it will elaborate on the principle of net neutrality
is unclear. In April 2014, the European Parliament included net neutrality in the
proposal for the regulation at the last minute, but the Council, i.e. the member
states, has effectively dismantled the proposal on the issue of net neutrality in
2015. The mandatory nature of a European Regulation, which replaces national
law, means that eu meetings are a battlefield in the European war of net neutrality.
Like the Netherlands, Peru, Chile and Brazil have also laid down net neutrality in
legislation (De Filippi and Belli 2014), but it remains a highly controversial subject,
both politically and economically. Specifically, major economic interests are at
stake, with heavyweights such as cable companies and telecom operators fiercely
resisting stricter regulation because it would rule out tiered pricing. President Oba-
ma’s recent proposals to regulate net neutrality in the us were immediately dis-
missed by cable and broadband companies in scathing language (‘a 1930s regula-
tion’).7 They want the leeway to develop new revenue models.
Because net neutrality is a negative rule – it regulates what an isp may not do – it is
difficult to determine where the exact boundary lies. The boundary between isp
network management and quality of service interventions (often considered legit-
imate and useful) and isp interventions that are discriminatory and/or tend
towards censorship is blurred and very difficult for regulators to define (DeNardis
2014; Brown and Marsden 2013). In this debate, too, isps take centre stage.
Thanks to dpi technology, these increasingly important players in cyberspace are
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able to intervene in data streams running through their networks. Their reasons
for doing so range from technical maintenance to financial profit (a key point in the
net neutrality debate) or censorship, for economic (blocking copyright-protected
content) or political reasons (blocking politically unwelcome content). These lat-
ter two forms of what is referred to as ‘intermediary censorship’ (Zuckerman 2010;
Brown and Marsden 2013) will be discussed in Chapter 4.
3 . 3 . 4 i n t e r n e t  s e c u r i t y
Now that the Internet has become central to our lives, it has also become a vulnera-
bility. It is a ‘backbone of backbones’ (Choucri 2012), with all the associated conse-
quences and risks. As a result, the concept of what security means on the Internet
has changed. When the basic mechanisms of the Internet were first set up, security
was not an overriding concern. The end-to-end principle and the ‘dumb pipe’
nature of the network imply that security is the responsibility of the endpoints.
Viruses can spread like wildfire across the network precisely because the Internet
sends data as efficiently as possible at the user’s command, regardless of the con-
tent of that data. That is true even if the command is hidden in an attachment that
the user has to open (e.g. the i love you virus) or picked up on a dubious website
(‘drive by downloads’). The power of the Internet – the rapid distribution of infor-
mation – can also be its weakness. The engineers who wrote the core protocols in
the early years were not really concerned about security in the sense of protection
against malicious individuals intent on using the power of the Internet for their
own gain. The relatively small, homogenous and closed community that built and
nurtured the early Internet focused on good intentions, not abuse. As the number
of users grew, however, the online world began to resemble the offline world with
its crime, vandalism, political disputes and other security issues. Every day, news-
papers report new cases of cyberattacks, phishing, malware, digital espionage,
mass surveillance and DDoS attacks. These risks have become a greater concern
than network overload and redundancy, which belong to a more technical
approach to the Internet.
In cyberspace, security has traditionally been the responsibility of the end user,
who is responsible for installing the right software to ward off viruses and other
attacks. The order of scale has naturally increased in recent decades, with busi-
nesses securing their own networks and network operators spending a lot of
money on security. Operating at a higher, collective, level are the Computer Emer-
gency Response Teams (certs). These operate in many different countries around
the world. In the Netherlands, for example, there is a government cert, Govcert,
now part of the National Cyber Security Centre, as well as certs of a number of
large companies and universities. Most digitally advanced countries have one or
more national certs, although their quality and expertise vary widely (see for a
typology Skierka et al. 2015: 11-12). The national certs work together at the inter-
national level as well, though international agreements are often less important
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than mutual trust between the technicians. All these organisations and many
others work together on Internet security. But what we mean by Internet security
is changing. Not only have the actual threats become more multifaceted, but so has
our interpretation of them and the tools that we use or can use against them.
The rise in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, in which a botnet so
overloads a website that it crashes, looks different to a law enforcement officer
working in a High Tech Crime Unit of the police than it does to a cert technician.
The officer sees cybercrime, looks for a motive and ‘weapons’, and wants to arrest
and prosecute the perpetrator. The cert technician sees an overloaded website
and network and wants to resolve the problem. The easiest way to do that is to
increase bandwidth. Both want to get rid of the botnet, of course, but engineers do
not immediately think in terms of crime and punishment. Our point is that there
are many different concepts of Internet security that influence each other back and
forth, not always for the better.
These different attitudes towards cybersecurity are at odds with each other, as they
have been before. The side feeling the most pressure is the one that views cyber-
security from the perspective of the Internet engineer. Its biggest challenge is the
growing tendency to frame cybersecurity in terms of national security. Intelli-
gence and security agencies, military cyber commands and, to a lesser extent, law
enforcement agencies are increasingly dominant in the public and political debate
about the Internet. The work of the international technical community, however,
is carried out largely on the basis of mutual trust built up over the course of many
years. That is especially true of the certs, where private and public parties often
share information about problems and solutions on an informal basis (Skierka
et al. 2015). Yurie Ito of Japan’s cert (jpcert) issued the following warning at the
Internet Governance Forum on Bali in 2013:
The involvement of the national security organisations can potentially break down in
trust, in cert and technical communities if we were seen as an instrument of state
focused competition. … So the result may be a significant rise in cybersecurity risk level
because of the lack of transparency and the collaboration at the technical and, you know,
cert level, operational level.8
Several authors have pointed out the contradiction between national security,
whose rationale is based by definition on the interests of a state, and the collective
security of the Internet as a public good. Dunn Cavelty (2014), for example, has
referred to the ‘cybersecurity dilemma’, in which using cyberspace as a tool for
national security has detrimental effects on the level of collective cybersecurity
globally (see also section 4.4). There is little scope for making mistakes in national
security, however, and that becomes evident in the way that politicians address the
subject. Van Eeten and Bauer (2009) compared ‘precluded event security’ and
‘marginal security cost’ in this connection. The first involves an absolute security
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standard to which almost everything else must give way; the second weighs the
benefits of security against the cost to society. Such costs go beyond the financial
– security is an expensive affair – to include intangible costs, for example the values
of the rule of law (aiv 2014) or a different view of Internet security and the critical
issue of trust between the organisations and individuals involved. The first
approach is becoming more dominant in the cybersecurity discourse.
In their efforts to neutralise the ‘national security’ logic, and particularly its conse-
quences, the technical and cert community are attempting to reframe the issue of
Internet security and reorganise the response to it. One interesting example is the
Cyber Green Initiative, which applies a public health model to global cybersecurity
rather than a national security model (jpcert/cc 2014). Building on the concept
of the Internet as an ecosystem, this initiative views cybersecurity as a question of
‘cyber health’, with the point being to fight off and prevent botnets and malware
that threaten that ecosystem. A crucial first step in this approach is for stakeholders
around the world to standardise, share and disclose information about cyber
threats, DDoS attacks and other threats. The result should be more accurate and
realistic estimates of cyber threats and a more level playing field in terms getting
information to policymakers and cybersecurity professionals. At a time of threat
inflation, it can be very useful to have a better grasp of what the real cyber threats
are and to move the discussion about network security out of the shadow of
national security.
3.4 conclusion
The Internet’s public core is in good health and good hands, but pressure on it is
building from different quarters. In some respects, it is a victim of its own over-
whelming success. Its exponential growth has exhausted the stock of ipv4
addresses in some parts of the world and made the Internet community so enor-
mous (billions of users) that the mass transition to ipv6 can no longer be based on
the notion of ‘doing what is right for the network’s overall good’. Its success has
created a collective action problem that will likely only be solved after things take a
turn for the worse. The lax attitude of both the industry and governments suggests
that it may take a crisis to spur them into action.
The pressure also comes from outside the Internet’s core in a number of the issues
discussed above. Political and economic interests and differences of opinion
– sometimes combined with new technologies – are challenging the collective
nature of the Internet. Important economic interests – for example copyright pro-
tection and revenue models for data transport – are putting pressure on policy-
makers to abolish or, conversely, offer legislative protection to net neutrality, pre-
viously the Internet’s technical default setting. Some countries have clearly chosen
sides in this matter, but even then, monitoring the actions of isps is a point of con-
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cern. These issues show that the Internet is masterful at blurring boundaries. It is
difficult to decide where the dividing line lies between ‘network management’ on
the one hand and slowing or blocking data traffic for ‘improper reasons’ on the
other. isps have become key actors and the gatekeepers of international data traffic.
They have been manoeuvred into a position of gatekeeper by states and other par-
ties, but questions of legitimacy are complicating this – often unwanted –status.
The political pressure on Team Internet is closely related to changes in interna-
tional politics and the rise of national security as a key paradigm for how govern-
ments relate to cyberspace. In analysing both trends, we should be aware that the
Internet is inextricably bound up with the internationalisation of the economies
and societies of a growing number of countries. In other words, there is much at
stake for these states. The fact that they have a very limited say in matters of Inter-
net governance has raised questions about the existing governance arrangements.
The domain name and ip address issue is a good example of how a technical func-
tion can become overly politicised. Removing oversight of these iana functions
from the us’s direct sphere of influence is logical from the vantage point of inter-
national politics: after all, the Internet has become vital to virtually every country,
not just the us. But that in itself does not clarify what shape future oversight will
take and how and whether state interests should be taken into account. Two mat-
ters are of crucial importance in this regard. First, the transition process should
separate the administrative tasks from the more political aspects, with the techni-
cal community at the helm of the first and with more scope to accommodate polit-
ical and economic interests in the second. Most countries would benefit greatly
from technical management that is as ‘agnostic’ as possible, as it would do most to
ensure the operation of the Internet as a collective infrastructure in the long term.
Second, while the icann debate may be symbolic to some extent, that may make it
all the more critical. It is the most visible and, to some degree, the most tangible
discussion about the relatively vague notion of ‘Internet governance’. There are
likely to be many more such discussions about this subject in the future, but in
those discussions, seemingly small changes in the technical substructure may have
huge implications. This is why the icann debate serves as an important test case
for cyber diplomacy. Are new coalitions possible that look beyond the ‘usual sus-
pects’ of the transatlantic axis? We know roughly which side of the debate many
countries come down on, and those poised at the extreme ends of the spectrum are
not likely to change their positions. We cannot be as certain about another, large
group, whose members include many states in which the Internet still has enor-
mous growth potential. Their stake in the Internet will only increase as time
passes, and their ideas about Internet governance have not yet become rigid. A dip-
lomatic effort is needed to forge new international coalitions focused on securing
the public core of the Internet in the longer term.
g o v e r n a n c e  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r n e t 6 3
A preoccupation with national security is taking over in cyberspace, affecting the
way in which we perceive the Internet and, in particular, which actors states are
facilitating to promote Internet security. The many new actors in cyberspace
focusing on national security, for example the military, intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, are beginning to interfere with the more traditional techni-
cal approach of the certs and their long track record of international cooperation.
It would be unwise to combine the logics of the two sides, for two reasons. First,
national security is always an individual interest, whereas Internet security – the
security of the network as a whole – is a collective interest. Confusing the two log-
ics, or letting the first dominate, could seriously impair the trust that the technical
community has managed to accrue over the course of many years. It is therefore
extremely important to differentiate tasks. Second, the logic of national security
implies a much lower tolerance of risk. There is little political scope for ‘residual
risk’ and ‘trial and error’ in the realm of national security, since a single error could
be fatal. That logic brushes aside other opinions about security in which the stabil-
ity and reliability of the Internet as a global public good are at least as important, if
not more so. It is precisely in matters of national security versus the interests of the
collective Internet that states must exercise restraint and reserve. That is the only
way to guarantee the stability of the net in the long term. In reality, however, those
entrusted with national security are more likely to want to extend their reach than
show restraint. That is why it is important to put the issue of Internet security ver-
sus national security on the international agenda and to try to disentangle the vari-
ous attitudes towards Internet security. Chapter 5 provides a first attempt to do so.
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1 Even the most basic protocol, ip, received staunch support in 1982 when Vint Cerf and his
colleagues threatened the users of what was still a very small Internet with exclusion: ‘If you
don’t implement tcp/ip, you’re off the net’ (quoted in Wu 2011: 202).
2 See the statistics at: http://www.google.com/intl/nl/ipv6/statistics.html#tab=per-
country-ipv6-adoption, accessed 5 November 2014.
3 Interview with Prof. Erik Huizer, 21 January 2015.
4 Network management is about the efficient use of bandwidth and has at least two aspects to
it. Should scores of users be made to ‘suffer’ poor access and service because of the data-
intensive practices of a few? Or should those few users have their transmission speeds
reduced? Connected with this issue is the fact that certain applications, for example Voice
over ip, online gaming and streaming music and video are much more data-intensive and
more sensitive to bandwidth loss. No one is bothered whether the packets containing an
e-mail message arrive at their destination in bursts or if it takes somewhat longer to down-
load an e-mail. The slightest delay in a VoIP connection, however, makes conversation almost
impossible. In both cases, there are legitimate reasons to differentiate between data streams
and ensure that the network offers maximum quality to the majority of users.
5 This does not mean that major Internet companies like Netflix and Google do not invest
heavily in improving and guaranteeing user access – they certainly do.
6 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down meas-
ures concerning the European single market for electronic communications and to achieve a
Connected Continent, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:
52013PC0627.
7 Dominic Rushe (2014) ‘Net neutrality: cable companies 'stunned' by Obama's 'extreme' pro-
posals’, The Guardian, 11 November 2014. See: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2014/nov/10/cable-companies-obama-net-neutrality-proposals-fcc-fight.
8 8th Internet Governance Forum, Bali, Indonesia. Session number 143, 22 October 2013. See:
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf-2013-transcripts/1501-ws-143-emerging-cyber-
security-threats-, accessed 13 December 2013.
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4 national interests and the internet as a
global public good
Invite states in, and along with them comes their fragmentation and their stifling political
constraints; shut them out entirely, and there is a risk that accountability will disappear
and rights will be lost.
Milton Mueller (2010: 240)
4.1 introduction: where national interests intersect
with the internet’s core public infrastructure
This chapter focuses on a number of controversial developments in which the
Internet’s public core has been or is at risk of being violated. Such incidents
threaten the underlying values of the Internet as a global public good, something
that could have serious consequences for its technical and socioeconomic opera-
tion. Someone who messes with the dns, for example, messes with the Internet as
a whole. In other words, such developments involve infringements of the princi-
ples of universality, interoperability and accessibility owing to actions, policy and
legislation that place national and/or economic interests above the interests of the
Internet’s collective public core. The repercussions of such interventions can be
great. It is technically possible to ‘break’ the Internet, certainly if that means dam-
aging the integrity and reliability of its central protocols and, as a result, its opera-
tion as a whole.
This chapter reviews four situations in which policymakers have chosen to
develop and implement a particular policy ‘using’ the Internet’s public core.
This type of governance, which utilises the Internet’s infrastructure, is harmful to
that core. Such harm could have well been the outcome of a number of recent legis-
lative bills and treaties that were meant to protect copyright and intellectual prop-
erty rights on the Internet. Section 4.2 considers the driving forces behind such
legislation – in many instances classic examples of what economists call ‘regulatory
capture’, in which industry actually writes the law – and the consequences of some
of these bills. Several of them, for example sopa, pipa and acta, are now off the
agenda in their current form, but that removes neither the problem nor the forces
driving such legislation. As long as politicians are ignorant of the consequences of
certain technical interventions, it is likely that we will see new legislation that is
potentially damaging to the public core of the Internet. Section 4.3 considers one
of the biggest online controversies from a human rights perspective: censorship
and restrictions on freedom of expression. However, this book emphasises the
consequences of technical measures that affect the operation of the Internet’s pub-
lic core rather than human rights violations in the global digital context. Sections
4.2 and 4.3 both stress the key role of isps as the preferred intermediary actors with
the ability to control and regulate the behaviour of consumers, the public and busi-
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nesses. Governments and corporate powers such as the entertainment industry
turn to isps to safeguard their interests by enlisting their help through legislation
and/or by applying pressure through legal liabilities and the threat of lawsuits.
The risk, of course, is that this will push surveillance and censorship into the back
office of cyberspace, beyond the range of legal and democratic oversight. Sec-
tion 4.4 concentrates on the growing influence of actors in the national security
domain on the Internet. The rising online presence of security and intelligence
agencies and the military has implications not only for privacy but also for the
integrity of the Internet’s technical operations. Section 4.5, finally, looks at
attempts by states to nationalise parts of the Internet and explores what this means
for its operation as a whole. While authoritarian regimes have long nurtured ambi-
tions in this direction (the Great Firewall of China or Iran’s National Internet),
they have recently been joined by democratic states such as Germany and Brazil,
responding to Edward Snowden’s revelations about nsa surveillance by laying out
plans to nationalise data traffic, clouds and hardware (subsea cables). But moves to
nationalise the net that require interventions in routing protocols, for example, are
severely at odds with the way in which the Internet normally operates and trans-
mits information.
4.2 ip versus ip 1
“The Internet is a gigantic, globally distributed always-on copying machine”
(Mueller 2010: 131). Users can consult, download and share content regardless of
their location. The rise of person-to-person (P2P) software has allowed more and
more people to share copyright-protected music, film, games and books illegally.
That naturally violates the protection offered by intellectual property rights and
copyright law. With a powerful lobby and an army of lawyers, the film, music and
entertainment industry has spent many years fighting for stricter national laws and
international treaties prohibiting the unauthorised sharing and downloading of
copyright-protected digital content (Breindl and Briatte 2010). Increasingly, the
legal regimes and measures deployed and advocated by the industry interfere with
the Internet’s critical technical infrastructure, for example ip addresses or the dns.
But this strategy, which uses the Internet itself to protect intellectual property, is
meeting with growing resistance from users, Internet companies, civil society and
the technical community. They argue that the measures are ineffective, ignore the
basic principles of the rule of law, and last but not least are damaging to the Inter-
net’s very operation. The protection of intellectual property has become one of the
key issues in the battle for governance of the Internet, succinctly summarised by
Mueller (2010: 129) as ‘ip versus ip’, or Intellectual Property versus Internet Proto-
col.
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The clash between the two ips can be attributed to two diametrically opposed pro-
cesses that initially had almost nothing to do with each other. The first was the lib-
eralisation of the telecommunications industry. Cyberspace benefited enormously
from this process, which made a decentralised, competitive and global Internet
possible. The second involved attempts to regulate the global protection of intel-
lectual property rights, leading to various international treaties such as the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or trips (wto
1994), the wipo Copyright Treaty, or wct, the wipo Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty, or wppt (wipo 1996) and the European Union Copyright Directive
(2001). The dizzying growth of the Internet led to a clash between these two pro-
cesses, and attention soon shifted from protecting software patents to tackling
online ‘piracy’.
It is difficult to protect intellectual property on the worldwide Internet, however.
In order to profit from intellectual property, access to it has to be restricted.
But because digital content can be reproduced an infinite number of times and dis-
tributed around the world at marginal cost, without the owner even noticing, it is
almost impossible to protect (Boyle 1997). Digitisation had already destabilised
laws and policies pertaining to copyright. It made it much easier for users to share
copyright-protected material, especially once P2P file sharing began to take off on
Napster, LimeWire, Torrentz, Pirate Bay and other sites. The early years of the
twenty-first century saw a series of lawsuits filed against organised forms of P2P
file sharing, for example against Napster in the us (2001) and mmo in Japan (2002).
A recent similar case in the Netherlands led to the prohibition of Pirate Bay. Such
prohibitions have not had any real long-term effect, however (Poort et al. 2014;
Danaher et al. 2013), as these websites tend to be replaced by new and smarter ver-
sions of P2P tools almost overnight. In addition, so many people now download
material from illegal sources that we can genuinely say that the practice has been
‘democratised’. In the Netherlands alone, more than a quarter of the population
aged between 18 and 65 years download files illegally (Poort and Leenheer 2012).
With lawsuits being expensive and time-consuming, not to mention the pr risks
involved (‘Rich Entertainment Industry Ruins Downloading Teenager’), the
entertainment industry decided many years ago to focus on political lobbying.
Its aim is to advocate new laws that (a) target Internet intermediaries such as isps
and (b) impose rules that use the Internet’s architecture. A number of such regula-
tions have been already been implemented in practice.
One of the interesting features of these laws is that they require private Internet
companies to take action. There are two kinds of legislation. The most common is
the ‘notice and take down’ regime, with Internet companies being made responsi-
ble for blocking access to specific content. In return, their legal liability for having
hosted or transferred illegal content is reduced. For example, the us Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (1998) indemnifies isps but requires that they remove content
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at the request of the copyright holder. We can gain an idea of the scale by noting
that in 2012, Google received more than 6.5 million requests to remove copyright-
protected material within the space of just one month (DeNardis 2014: 178).
The risk here is that content monitoring – and, by extension, censorship – will
shift to the anonymous layer of isps and other Internet intermediaries, character-
ised by Zuckerman (2010) as the rise of ‘intermediary censorship’. When govern-
ments – in this case backed and prodded by a powerful industry – succeed in forc-
ing Internet companies to follow these rules and enforce them among their own
users, implementation and censorship have been ‘effectively outsourced to private
industry’ (MacKinnon 2011: 197). Things are taken to the next level if these compa-
nies start to reject content preventively in order to avoid damage claims and law-
suits or conflicts with governments. In that case, government has not only con-
tracted out the letter of the law to private parties, but the spirit of the law as well.
A more radical approach is the ‘graduated response’ mechanism, as implemented
by law in France, South Korea, Chile and Taiwan, and as the product of a private
agreement between an isp and the entertainment industry in the United King-
dom, the United States and Ireland (Brown and Marsden 2013; DeNardis 2014;
Van Eeten et al. 2014). In this system, the user receives a number of warnings
before their Internet connection is disabled or its speed is reduced so drastically
that it is impossible to download large files. Access to certain services can also sim-
ply be blocked. In practice, Internet companies are usually the ones to impose this
measure because they are in the best strategic position to confront users and also
have the technical know-how to do so. Their role has been laid down in law
and/or user agreements in many countries. Now that dpi has made it possible for
isps to analyse Internet traffic, some parties have argued that they should be forced
to actively monitor data traffic on behalf of copyright owners. The European Court
of Justice rejected this notion with its judgment in Scarlet v. sabam (C-70/10) in
November 2011.2 Once again, the tendency is to shift surveillance and policy
implementation to the Internet’s private back office, gradually removing it from
public oversight.
Most proposals to regulate copyright online came about under severe pressure
from the media and entertainment industry. They are classic examples of ‘regula-
tory capture’, a situation in which legislation is heavily influenced by a specific
group of stakeholders. This changed some years ago when global mass protests
arose against two new us bills, the Stop Online Piracy Act (sopa) and the Protect
ip Act (pipa), as well as against the international Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (acta). Following large-scale protests, ratification of acta by the eu
member states was shelved after the European Parliament rejected it. The Juncker
European Commission – in office since November 2014 – has placed it on the list of
proposals that will be withdrawn. The protests against sopa, pipa and acta are
regarded as a turning point in the history of copyright legislation (Benkler 2012;
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Hofmann 2012; Dubuisson 2012). Because it was the first time that the online com-
munity had organised itself and taken collective action, that turning point has also
been described as a battle between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ economy’: ‘pipa and
sopa became nothing less than a referendum on who controlled the evolution of
digital life’ (Downes 2012, cited in Hofmann 2012: 74-75). Both us bills would have
extended the ‘notice and take down system’ of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (1998) to payment and advertisement networks. The bills also offered private
parties immunity against damage that they might cause by erroneously blocking
certain content and payments (Hofmann 2012). The scope of sopa and pipa was
not limited to the United States, but also covered websites abroad or sites that
could be accessed through domain names registered abroad. This was one of the
reasons for the worldwide interest in the two bills. A vast amount of that interest
was generated by Wikipedia, Reddit and WordPress, which protested by going
‘black’ for one day, on 18 January 2012, making parts of the Web inaccessible. Wiki-
pedia asked its visitors to ‘Imagine a World Without Free Knowledge’ and Google
placed a censor bar over its logo. The protest pitted freedom of speech and infor-
mation against excessive copyright protection.
The Internet’s technical community also criticised sopa and pipa because they
undermined the operation of the Internet by interfering with its deeper technical
architecture. Since the bills would have impinged on the most basic Internet pro-
tocols, dns and ip, ‘Don’t Break the Internet’ became another key slogan of the
protests. Many of the Internet’s pioneers took up their pens to write to their elec-
ted representatives in Congress, stating that, ‘regardless of recent amendments to
sopa, both bills will risk fragmenting the Internet’s global domain name system
(dns) and have other capricious technical consequences’.3 They were joined by
scientists, who argued that ‘directing the remedial power of the courts towards the
Internet’s core technical infrastructure in this sledgehammer fashion has impact
far beyond intellectual property rights enforcement – it threatens the fundamental
principle of interconnectivity that is at the very heart of the Internet’ (Lemley et al.
2011). In other words, introducing either law could cause serious harm to the Inter-
net’s backbone. The dns is one of the main building blocks of the Internet and,
along with certain other protocols, constitutes the basis for virtually all other pro-
tocols and countless applications that allow the Internet to function properly and
reliably (Lemley et al. 2011). Blocking content for reasons of intellectual property
and copyright protection would mean that users could no longer trust the search
results of dns servers. Interfering in basic protocols would not only make the
Internet less reliable and universal, it would also make it less secure.
Whether such measures would be effective is also very much open to debate.
Even trivial changes are enough to circumvent Internet blockages, for example
typing in an ip address (rather than a domain name) to avoid consulting the dns
server. Readily available, easy-to-install software plug-ins can also link users auto-
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matically with dns servers that are not blocked (Crocker et al. 2011). Such tricks
tend to spread quickly among unapologetic uploaders and downloaders. Illegal
content also resurfaces quickly after a blockage, as the prohibition of P2P networks
has demonstrated. The decline of one usually heralds the rise of another.
More worrying is that ‘overblocking’ can also cause considerable collateral damage.
Online interdependence – for example virtual hosting or a website offering serv-
ices and e-mails that run through other domains – can easily lead to a larger section
of the dns being blocked than the law had intended. Incidents in which tens of
thousands of subdomains are blocked accidentally show how very real this prob-
lem is. It is for this reason that Yu (2012; 2014) calls such measures ‘highly dispro-
portional’.
The threat of interference in the deep layers of the Internet remains, however. Sim-
ilar new proposals have been put forward to enforce copyright law (Masnick 2014),
and although technical filtering is imperfect and inevitably results in too much or
too little content being blocked (Zittrain and Palfrey 2008), it has become a com-
mon means of protecting intellectual property (Sellars 2014; Breindl 2013). This is
mainly the result of the unilateral and uneven involvement of stakeholders in deci-
sion-making about intellectual property regulations. A second shortcoming is that
those who make or approve such legislation know little about the Internet’s tech-
nical aspects. In the battle over sopa and pipa, more and more publications
appeared arguing that it ‘was no longer ok’ for Members of Congress not to under-
stand how the Internet works (McDiarmid and Sohn 2013). This criticism is cer-
tainly not restricted to American politics. Such ignorance allows the economic
interests of the entertainment industry to override those of the Internet’s collec-
tive core, thereby putting pressure on the public Internet.
4.3 censorship and surveillance
Left to its own devices, the Internet is a platform where people can express even
the most extreme ideas. But its very appeal as a bastion of free speech means that it
has from the outset been regarded with suspicion by regimes wishing to exercise
strict control over the information that reaches their populations. Authoritarian
regimes allow their populations access to cyberspace, but only under conditions of
surveillance and censorship. Today, some of the optimistic ideals held at the birth
of the Internet, i.e. the predominantly Western notion that cyberspace and censor-
ship were incompatible and that technology would inescapably encourage and
facilitate freedom of speech, have been largely abandoned. Digital freedom of
speech and other digital manifestations of traditional human rights now feature
prominently on the diplomatic agendas of many Western countries. In 2010,
Hillary Clinton put ‘Internet freedom’ on the State Department’s agenda; in 2011,
the Netherlands took the lead in setting up the Freedom Online Coalition4 of
states working together to protect and support freedom of speech in the digital
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domain. But when Clinton resigned as Secretary of State, the American agenda for
Internet freedom was put on the back burner, and since the Snowden revelations
the us has lost much of its remaining credibility as a leader in this regard.
Governments the world over are monitoring and controlling Internet traffic more
actively than ever before (Howard et al. 2011; for relevant overviews, see Deibert
et al. 2008; 2010; 2011). Authoritarian regimes go furthest in that regard, but liberal
democracies are not entirely innocent either. From the very start, China connected
to the worldwide Internet with the idea of controlling its own population. China
has ‘state-owned hardware servers, state-owned fibre optics via state-owned
switches, boiling down to the idea that “China is not on the Internet, it’s basically
an intranet”‘ (Herold 2011: 5). China has built a wall around ‘its’ Internet with only
a few gates leading to the outside; it installs content-control software on pcs
(Green Dam Youth Escort) and regularly shuts down certain services such as
Wikipedia in order to install filters that block content automatically based on key-
word recognition (Zuckerman 2010). All incoming and outgoing Internet traffic in
Saudi Arabia also passes through a single, filtered gateway (Zittrain and Palfrey
2008), and the plans for Iran’s national Internet follow the same logic.5
The scope of censorship has increased, and states also have access to a growing
array of digital censorship tools and strategies to monitor their populations. In the
early days of cyberspace, people often thought that slow-moving authoritarian
regimes would never be agile enough to keep up with the fast-paced young world
of the Internet. But these sluggish giants became digitally adept sooner than
expected, and censorship also became more technologically refined and intelligent.
Although states still block content in emergency situations, many countries now
permit Internet use under surveillance because it is an important source of infor-
mation for their police and intelligence agencies. While it is impossible to ‘switch
off’ the Internet as a whole, there are numerous ‘kill-switches’ (DeNardis 2014:
207-213). They range from blocking specific content to dns blockages, and from
DDoS attacks on specific websites to forcing isps to deny users access to their net-
works, leading to outages in parts of cyberspace. That is what happened in Egypt in
2011, when the Internet went black for several days during the uprising against the
Mubarak regime. Before that, outages took place in Libya, Burma, Nepal and Iran
(DeNardis 2014). Budish and Kumar (2013) call these strategic blockages ‘just in
time censorship’, used before an election, for example, to block information from
or in support of the opposition. Sometimes, however, content blocking can have
wider implications because those taking action interfere with the dns or routing
protocols. The most famous example is Pakistan’s blocking of YouTube, which had
worldwide repercussions. In 2008, the Pakistani Ministry of Information ordered
YouTube to be blocked in Pakistan, accusing it of carrying blasphemous material.
Pakistan Telecom went about complying with the order in a rather clumsy manner,
however; the change it made to the routing protocol not only affected Pakistani
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isps, but was broadcast and adopted globally, causing YouTube to become inacces-
sible across the entire Internet (DeNardis 2014: 96; Deibert 2013b: 40). Although
the error was quickly corrected, this example shows just how tightly interwoven
the Internet is through its core protocols, and how vulnerable those protocols are
to national actions motivated by a specific idea about what is and is not permissible
in cyberspace.
Western states are also joining in, with filtering now being common as a means of
combating extremist or terrorist content, for example. The Charlie Hebdo attacks
in Paris have led some officials to argue that the private sector should work with
government to remove extremist content from the net, but they mention the
detection and removal of illegal content in general almost in the same breath.6
States around the world have different reasons – political, religious and societal –
for blocking the Internet, and use different tools to do so (Zittrain and Palfrey
2008). Western democracies use filtering primarily to (a) combat genocidal, terro-
rist and racist content, although countries also differ widely in their opinions
about this (Breindl 2013); and (b) to prevent infringements of intellectual property
rights. And like other regimes, liberal democracies attempt to make the Internet
and the activities that take place in cyberspace subject to national legislation.
The fight against cybercrime and the dissemination of child pornography are at the
top of the agenda in many countries, for instance. An older but well-known exam-
ple is the French government’s lawsuit against Yahoo to force it to remove Nazi
paraphernalia from an auction site. More recently, various private companies
– including Every dns, Amazon, MasterCard, Visa and PayPal – ceased providing
services to WikiLeaks following the ‘Cablegate’ affair, making WikiLeaks unfinda-
ble and unable to generate revenue (Brown and Marsden 2013). Benkler (2011)
believes there is a direct relationship between their ‘spontaneous’ decisions and
calls by us Senator Joseph Liebermann and others to pull the plug on WikiLeaks.
The companies, however, claim that they were not responding to political pressure
or to any official government or court request. This situation raises questions
about the role of private parties in protecting and/or restricting freedom of speech.
Increasingly, Internet companies are faced with a dilemma with regard to freedom
of speech. On the one hand, governments expect them to uphold strict human
rights standards while competing for a share of the Internet’s growing interna-
tional market. While she was us Secretary of State, for example, Hillary Clinton
(in 2010) expected Silicon Valley to assist in the fight against censorship and the
battle to protect human rights, saying that, ‘American companies need to make a
principled stand. This needs to be part of our national brand. I’m confident that
consumers worldwide will reward companies that follow those principles.’ On the
other hand, when Western governments are themselves eager to intervene in
cyberspace for reasons that they consider legitimate in their own national context,
it is to these companies that they turn for access, information and even implemen-
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tation of policy. Nowadays, those reasons are often related to security and national
security (see section 4.4). Governments are submitting more and more requests
for information. In late 2012, for example, the Netherlands set up Clean it, an eu
project that it has undertaken jointly with Belgium, the uk, Germany and Spain to
purge the Internet of terrorist content based on informal cooperation with isps, i.e.
without any binding government directives. The project has been completed, but
the intentions expressed by the eu ministers in Riga in January of 2015 indicate
that it will have a follow-up. The important role that Internet companies play in
global cyberspace raises questions about their responsibility and autonomy. As yet,
international law applies mainly to the behaviour of states; the idea of applying it
directly to international enterprises is relatively new (Scherer and Palazzo 2011:
911). John Ruggie, the un Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business
and Human Rights between 2005 and 2011, commented that international corpo-
rations mainly utilise self-regulatory processes in which the interpretation of
rights can be ‘so elastic that they lose all meaning’ (Ruggie 2007: 836). The ‘Ruggie
principles’, which he recommended to the un and which the un adopted in 2011,
marked the start of a discussion about the role of businesses in human rights pro-
tection. These principles merit more attention in the digital domain, for example
within the context of the un Human Rights Council resolution recommending
the establishment of a working group on a legally binding international instru-
ment on transnational corporations and human rights.
Internet companies do not simply comply unquestioningly with all requests to
block content. They have some leeway to consider all the factors and interests
involved. But in many respects they do cooperate – sometimes voluntarily, some-
times not – with requests submitted by competent authorities. The transparency
reports that Google,7 Twitter8 and Microsoft9 publish to account for their actions
to the Internet community reveal that it is mainly liberal democratic regimes that
request the most data (at least openly) (Deibert 2013). Many of these requests and
website ‘blocklists’ are not in the public domain and therefore subject to little if
any democratic oversight (Zittrain and Palfrey 2008; Brown and Marsden 2013).
The same applies to blockages arising from agreements between private parties
(Van Eeten et al. 2014). Most censorship is therefore laid squarely in the lap of the
Internet companies. Their response is to comply in some situations, to resist the
express wishes of the authorities in others (especially if they are companies who
count their public reputation among their most prized assets), and in yet other cir-
cumstances to stay one step ahead by taking preventive action, as appeared to be
the case with Cablegate and WikiLeaks. DeNardis (2014: 158-159) refers in this con-
nection to ‘discretionary censorship’, but it is not clear to what extent these com-
panies have discretion and what choices the various enterprises make in that
regard. All of this is part of a broader movement towards what Zuckerman (2010)
calls ‘intermediary censorship’, with private businesses undertaking public tasks
without public oversight. Strategies of this kind may have a negative radiating
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effect and undermine the credibility of Western countries which condemn censor-
ship by authoritarian regimes (Yu 2012; 2014). Filtering, the collateral damage asso-
ciated with overblocking, the lack of transparency and the potential for abusing
technical interventions all come at a price; according to Mueller (2010: 209-211),
they are nibbling away at the free and open communication that has made the
Internet a success.
4.4 internet security versus national security
In Chapter 3, we touched briefly on the rise of the national security mindset in
cyberspace. Over time, cybersecurity has increasingly become a matter of national
security. The Netherlands is no exception in that regard. Five years ago, it was the
Ministry of Economic Affairs that was largely responsible for most Internet-related
policy, which focused on e-commerce and establishing statutory frameworks for
telecom and Internet companies. Today, however, the centre of gravity has shifted
to the issue of cybersecurity, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Security
and Justice, or more precisely the National Coordinator for Security and Counter-
terrorism (nctv). The Ministry of Defence is right behind them with an opera-
tional Cyber Command and the official authority to conduct both defensive and
offensive military operations in cyberspace. A similar shift from economy to secur-
ity has also taken place within the eu. The European Commission’s Directorate-
General for Communications Networks, Content & Technology (dg connect) is
by no means the only dg that concerns itself with the Internet; the dgs for Justice
and for Home Affairs and the Commission’s diplomatic corps (the European
External Action Service, eeas) have also prioritised cybersecurity on their policy
agendas.
Whilst there is no denying that the Internet is not as secure as it once was, it is
difficult to say precisely how big the threat is and who is being threatened. In addi-
tion, the question is whether states are putting the right agencies and organisa-
tions forward to combat the right threats (Dunn Cavelty 2014). Many researchers
warn about the danger of ‘threat inflation’ and the unhelpful language of national
security and warfare (Brito and Watkins 2011; Betz and Stevens 2011; Libicki 2012;
Rid 2013; Lawson 2013). This does not mean that all of the Internet has been securi-
tised or militarised, but policymakers are increasingly looking at cyberspace
through different eyes. Today, the Internet of economic opportunities is also the
Internet of threats, vulnerable critical infrastructures and national security.
Indeed, the emphasis may have even swung towards the latter.
And that has consequences, as became painfully clear when Edward Snowden
revealed that the nsa and its British counterpart, gchq (among others), had spied
on large swathes of global Internet traffic in the interests of national security
(Greenwald 2014). The various surveillance programmes that Snowden exposed,
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including prism, muscular and bullrun,10 reveal intelligence agencies with a
voracious appetite for data collection, legal frameworks that failed to rein them in,
inadequate judicial and democratic oversight, and the wholesale violation of per-
sonal privacy – and all for seemingly very few gains in terms of national security
(Landau 2013; Glennon 2014; Van Hoboken and Rubinstein 2014; Mueller and
Stewart 2014). Thanks to new technology and generous budgets, the reality of
these intelligence and security agencies is a far cry from more traditional views on
national security and their role in that context.
In prior generations, the cost of surveillance and data acquisition constituted a useful buf-
fer between state surveillance and privacy; resource constraints forced law enforcement to
focus on a limited number of targets on a scale where judicial oversight was a practical— if
imperfect— deterrent against overreach
(Faris and Gasser 2013: 21).
In addition to the mass violations of privacy that evoked such a fierce global
response, Snowden revealed that the agencies had interfered with the deep techni-
cal infrastructure of the Internet that we all use every day, all in the name of
national security. Tim Berners-Lee, the man who invented the www, called the
decision by the nsa and gchq to break encryption software that protects the
transfer of data on the Web ‘appalling and foolish’, as it directly contradicted the
us and uk’s efforts to fight cybercrime and increase cyber security, which both
countries had identified as national security priorities. He also called it a betrayal
of the technology industry.11 In January 2014, a large group of us cryptography and
information security researchers wrote an open letter to the us government con-
curring with Berners-Lee’s views and stating: ‘The choice is not whether to allow
the nsa to spy. The choice is between a communications infrastructure that is vul-
nerable to attack at its core and one that, by default, is intrinsically secure for its
users’.12
The tension between the ‘needs’ of the intelligence community and the interests
of the it and Internet industry had already surfaced during the ‘cryptowars’ of the
1990s. These disputes were about the encryption of American commercial soft-
ware, and in particular about placing restrictions on the export of cryptography
outside the us. The software concerned was destined for the vast majority of ordi-
nary computer and Internet users worldwide. The it industry wanted to export
products with high-quality encryption, but the us intelligence community was
fiercely opposed because it did not want to have restrictions imposed on its ability
to break into Internet communications and it systems around the world
(Van Hoboken and Rubinstein 2014; Landau 2010; 2014). In other words, the intel-
ligence agencies wanted to guarantee access for themselves by weakening encryp-
tion standards, by obtaining cryptographic master keys, or by inserting secret
‘backdoors’ and other vulnerabilities into software supplied to users worldwide.
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After a long battle between the intelligence agencies and the industry, the restric-
tions on exports were ultimately lifted. We now know that the agencies have con-
tinued their campaign, however. In the post-Snowden era, the big Internet compa-
nies and cloud services, which – knowingly or unknowingly – had ‘delivered’ mas-
sive amounts of data on their users to the nsa, responded to the scandal by
improving the cryptography of their own data centres. Their hope was that they
could win back the trust of customers both within the us and, especially, beyond.
After the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, the fbi and the nsa warned against the
‘dangers’ of the increased use of cryptography, and there are growing calls in both
the us and Europe to introduce statutory powers to break encryption. The fbi is
openly critical of Apple and Google, which have recently toughened the security
of their smartphones.13 The director of gchq also accused American technology
companies of being ‘command-and-control networks of choice for terrorists and
criminals’ because they had improved their encryption (cited in Faris and Heacock
Jones 2014: 34).
But the ambitions of security agencies go even further when it comes to accessing
data and communications, or even laying the groundwork to guarantee such
access. Snowden revealed that the nsa has not only attempted to crack cryptogra-
phy, but also did its best to deliberately weaken the official standards issued by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (nist). It has tried building vul-
nerabilities into cryptographic standards to ensure that it can always get inside sys-
tems through a backdoor. This did not only hurt the reputation of nist – a us fed-
eral agency – but also sabotaged general security in cyberspace as well as interna-
tional political relations. As Landau explains, ‘It appears that the nsa’s sigint
division viewed corrupting cryptography standards as a goal. If other governments
had done such a thing, the us would have been outraged’ (Landau 2014: vii).
The impact of interfering with standards naturally radiates outwards. Because pro-
tocols are certified standards, they are widely disseminated. That means that the
arm of the nsa extends a very long way in terms of access, but it also makes the
Internet extremely vulnerable and puts users at a high level of risk. Or, as cyber-
security expert Bruce Schneier put it, ‘You can’t build a back door that only the
good guys can walk through’.14
This latter aspect is especially pertinent in the international market for cyber inse-
curity that has matured in recent years. Every cyberattack – whether its nature is
determined by crime, espionage, cybervandalism or military goals – depends on
there being one or more vulnerabilities in the target’s software that provides access
to its systems. Known as ‘zero-day vulnerabilities’, these are software flaws
unknown to either the user or the software vendor, meaning that there are no
immediate patches available. The software vendor has ‘zero days’ to repair the vul-
nerability if a hacker discovers and exploits it. Hackers can turn these vulnerabili-
ties into cyberweapons by writing code that exploits them to damage systems or
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to use systems to cause damage (set off explosions, open dams, and so on). The lat-
ter are referred to as ‘cyberexploits’, or ‘weaponized code’. Cyberweapons come in
many shapes and sizes, from very simple ones with limited potential (such as a
DDoS attack) to precision weapons with massive potential (Rid and McBurney
2012: 6). The most famous example of the latter is the Stuxnet attack on Iran. Stux-
net was a computer worm that tampered with Iran’s nuclear centrifuges at the
Natanz facility and caused a significant setback in its nuclear programme. In all
probability the us and Israel were behind this cyberattack; it had all the hallmarks
of a long-term military operation requiring meticulous preparation and intelli-
gence and using an unprecedented four unknown zero-day vulnerabilities (Sanger
2012; Singer and Friedman 2014). us and Israeli military and intelligence probably
discovered the zero-day vulnerabilities themselves, but it is equally likely that they
purchased them on the growing international market for zero-day vulnerabilities.
The zero-day vulnerabilities market is divided into white, grey and black markets
and has expanded dramatically in recent years (Fidler 2014; Ablon et al. 2013).
In the early days of the www, hackers regarded it as a game to trace vulnerabilities
in software and alert vendors to them. The glow of success and recognition of their
achievement were often enough reward. For some, this form of ‘responsible dis-
closure’ still is an end in itself. Nowadays, however, hackers who track down vul-
nerabilities are usually paid, and paid well, by the same vendors. That is the white
market. But the real money is in the grey and black markets. The black market
operates online through websites such as Silk Road and its successors. Basically,
anything that is prohibited can be acquired there. The grey market is populated by
legitimate buyers – intelligence agencies and military cyberunits, although some of
them may also venture into the black market (Fidler 2014). The grey market is an
open and legal – but unregulated – market in which security specialists sell prod-
ucts on their websites and describe what they consider to be legitimate custom-
ers.15 For example, the French company vupen sells only to ‘approved government
agencies (Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Defence) in approved countries’.16
Operators in the grey market do not sell to countries that are subject to an interna-
tional arms embargo imposed by un, the us or the eu (see also Stockton and
Golabek-Goldman 2013). But since many of these companies may also supply the
arms industry, their product distribution is probably much wider (Fidler 2014).
The problem is that governments buy vulnerabilities in the software that we all
use (and which is used by our critical infrastructures, banks and clouds) and keep
them secret in the name of national security so that they can exploit them later for
military or intelligence purposes. Keeping these vulnerabilities secret is not with-
out its risks, however, because ‘their’ security and ‘our’ security in cyberspace are
intimately connected. It is once again Bruce Schneier (2014) who levels the sharp-
est criticism against the us intelligence and military ‘stockpiling’ of vulnerabili-
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ties: ‘There is no way to simultaneously defend U.S. networks while leaving for-
eign networks open to attack. Everyone uses the same software, so fixing us means
fixing them, and leaving them vulnerable means leaving us vulnerable’.
The lively trade in zero-day vulnerabilities again points to the growing tension
between national security in cyberspace and the security of cyberspace itself.
Myriam Dunn Cavelty (2014) has taken the security dilemma described by Jervis
(1978) and applied it to trends in the cyber domain, stating that, ‘paradoxically, the
use of cyber space as a tool for national security, both in the dimension of war
fighting and the dimension of mass surveillance, has detrimental effects on the
level of cyber security globally’. One state’s efforts to strengthen its national secur-
ity in cyber space evokes a response by another state, making the first state less
secure. As a result, security in all of cyberspace declines. Deibert and Rohozinksi
(2011) point out that China increased its military cyber capacity in response to the
us’s decision to install a military Cyber Command. At a 2014 conference on civil-
military cooperation in cyberspace, an expert in military cyberstrategy suggested
that that main fallout of the nsa revelations was that other states would now
attempt to build the same capacities.17 A cyber-Westphalian doctrine, with states
prioritising their national security, would have huge implications for the collective
backbone infrastructure of the Internet on which those states have built the cyber-
version of their country, economy and society. In cyberspace, states have become
so intimately intertwined with each other at the basic level of standards, encryp-
tion and software vulnerabilities that it is almost meaningless to think in terms of
‘us’ and ‘them’.
The foregoing means that a certain level of restraint is needed in cyberspace – espe-
cially in the realm of cyber warfare and intelligence – but that immediately gives
rise to an enormous problem. National security is grounded in the principle of
national sovereignty and is thus enshrined in national law; international law plays
only a very limited role. International law rarely addresses the topic of security and
intelligence agencies; instead, these agencies operate purely within a national leg-
islative and regulatory framework. Almost every country has (multiple) intelli-
gence and security agencies, and they all carry out roughly the same work and
operations, within the restrictions imposed by national law and, just as important,
by their budgets. That is precisely what makes the debate about the role of these
agencies so difficult, especially against the background of new technologies and
unexpected clashes between national security and Internet security (and, in turn,
national security again). Solutions are being considered in specified areas. For
example, some argue that the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies should be extended to
include cyberweapons and the trade in zero-day vulnerabilities (Stockton and
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Golabek-Goldman 2013; Fidler 2014). Although that would regulate the interna-
tional market to some extent, it would not really address the deeper cybersecurity
dilemma.
4.5 technological sovereignty
Until recently, the idea of screening off a ‘national’ section of the Internet was one
nurtured primarily by authoritarian regimes, with the Great Firewall of China and
the National Internet in Iran as the most striking examples. In the post-Snowden
era, however, it appears that more and more countries are looking for ways to bet-
ter protect their ‘own’ Internet, data traffic and storage. The question of sover-
eignty has long been a factor in cyberspace, and even Western countries are not
shy about enforcing their own national laws and rules in the digital domain.
Recently, however, a number of countries have tested the waters with measures
and initiatives that go a step beyond combating real-world crime – such as child
pornography and copyright infringement – in cyberspace.
Many citizens and governments perceive the revelations about the nsa, the gchq
and other intelligence agencies not only as a serious violation of privacy, but also as
a challenge to sovereignty. It should be noted that almost all the states that feel
compromised also have their own intelligence and security agencies with roughly
the same mandate and powers. The difference between states seems to be more
about budgets and technological capabilities than about the mandate and powers
of the agencies themselves. Nevertheless, many countries were outraged by the
scale and immensity of the nsa’s surveillance and by its targets, whether political
(friendly heads of state and government leaders such as Brazilian President Dilma
Rousseff and German Chancellor Angela Merkel), intermediary (from Google to
Belgacom) or economic (in some cases, spying in the name of national security
bore a strong resemblance to economic espionage). Since intelligence agencies
essentially operate outside any form of international regulation, and since such
regulation is unlikely to emerge in future, the countries affected are looking for
other ways to protect themselves against mass surveillance. Since many regard the
us as the biggest digital infiltrator, and since it intercepted vast amounts of data
mainly on websites, services, servers and clouds run by us corporations, they have
contemplated or taken various steps to ensure that their data traffic circumvents
the us or – if it runs via us platforms – to localise it where possible. ‘Technological
sovereignty’, ‘data sovereignty’, ‘data localisation’ and ‘national clouds’ in fact all
stem from the wish to avoid violations of privacy and prevent the surveillance of
individuals, companies and governments by foreign powers.
Following the surveillance disclosures by Snowden, which began in June 2013,
governments in various parts of the world debated new initiatives that qualify as
attempts to achieve technological sovereignty and/or data localisation (see e.g.
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Chander and Le 2014; Maurer et al. 2014; Polatin-Reuben and Wright 2014 for over-
views). One well-known example is Brazil’s plan to lay a new submarine cable that
links it directly to Europe, so that Brazilian data no longer need to travel via
American cables – and past the ‘prying eyes’ of the nsa. Europe has joined in with
its own initiatives, although some proposals now appear to have been quietly
removed from the agenda (Maurer et al. 2014). Some of these initiatives are based
on the idea of mandatory local data storage and mandatory local data routing.
The latter in particular clashes with the basic operation of the Internet Protocol,
which assumes that data will take the route that the network considers most effi-
cient at any given moment, depending on local data congestion. In addition, rout-
ing and storage are difficult to separate out in the era of cloud computing; storage
or computing capacity is located wherever the cloud network is least congested at
any given moment. Cloud data are therefore always in transit, a system inconsis-
tent with localisation. In the eu, Germany has been the most vocal about increas-
ing its technological sovereignty; it has proposed setting up national cloud serv-
ices and has excluded foreign companies from contracts if they cannot guarantee
that they will not share data with other governments. The German government’s
coalition agreement in fact explicitly states that it will make efforts to ‘regain tech-
nological sovereignty’ (cdu, csu and spd 2013: 103). In February 2014, French
President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel discussed set-
ting up a ‘European communications network’ in which as much data as possible
would be retained on a network of European servers (Maurer et al. 2014: 5). The
press has referred to this as an ‘eu cloud’ or ‘Schengen cloud’.18 But data national-
ism is also a rising trend in other parts of Europe and around the world.
Politicians and corporations in the us have been less than enthusiastic about the
European proposals. Their resistance is politically and economically motivated
(bad for Silicon Valley’s global corporations, and excluding us firms is unfair com-
petition), but also driven by worries about how the Internet will operate as a global
network. The two arguments are sometimes combined in a way that suits the rele-
vant party best, of course. The technical argument basically states that data sover-
eignty comes down to ‘breaking the Web’ (Chander and Le 2014) or ‘the end of the
Internet’ (Goldstein 2014). That is an exaggeration, however. Local routing can cer-
tainly be implemented without impairing the Internet’s infrastructure. Problems
will only arise if users are forced to use local services because routing to other serv-
ices has been blocked. In that case, localisation would undermine the distributed
network that is the Internet, conflicting with the ‘blind’ operation of the Internet
Protocol. If everyone wants as much of their data and data traffic as possible to cir-
culate behind their own digital borders, then the nature of the global Internet will
change. When Google’s Law Enforcement and Information Security Director
Richard Salgado testified before the us Senate in 2013, he warned of ‘the creation of
a “splinternet” broken up into smaller national and regional pieces with barriers
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around each of the splintered Internets to replace the global Internet we know
today’.19 The question is whether the remedy is worse than the disease and
– equally important – whether it will cure the disease at all.
A number of authors (Maurer et al. 2014; Chander and Le 2014) point out that local
data storage and routing do not guarantee immunity from espionage, not least
because intelligence agencies share quite a lot of information with each other inter-
nationally. The most prominent intelligence alliance, the ‘Five Eyes’, includes the
uk, an eu member state. That means that the us already has easy access to a con-
siderable amount of data captured by the British agencies. Using data localisation
to shut the front door is useless unless we also look critically at the international
exchange of bulk data between the various agencies. Recently, the Netherlands’
Advisory Council on International Affairs (aiv) (2014: 61) recommended using the
forthcoming reform of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act (wiv
2002) to consider the provision of better privacy safeguards for citizens in the
international exchange of data between national intelligence and security agencies.
Purely local storage of crucial data obviously qualifies as an important security
measure. Common sense tells us that some crucial data should be kept out of the
cloud. But Maurer et al. (2014), Chander and Le (2014) and others favour a different
solution to the problem of mass surveillance. Encryption of data traffic – both data
in transit and stored data – would make it much harder and much more expensive
for intelligence and security agencies to intercept data on a massive scale. It would
force the agencies to make choices and to rein themselves in – something that
scarcely seems necessary now, given the technology available to them. A rise in the
costs would reinstate financial considerations as a buffer between state surveillance
and privacy, in the manner described by Faris and Gasser (2013: 21) earlier in this
chapter. It would force intelligence agencies to fine-tune and target their activities
instead of throwing themselves into bulk data collection and other forms of ‘drag-
net surveillance’ (Lyon 2014).
The final political argument favouring restraint in technological and data sover-
eignty stems from diplomatic considerations. The number of people using the
Internet is set to increase exponentially in the years ahead, with most of the new
users living in non-Western countries. Issues of sovereignty and misgivings about
the Internet and its potentially liberating effect on the population play a much
larger role in those countries than in the Netherlands and Europe. If Europe itself
builds walls around the Internet that conflict with the operation of its core, then it
undermines any attempts on its part to persuade other countries – countries start-
ing out in the domain of Internet governance – of the importance of a properly
operating public core. ‘Practise what you preach’ is usually the best motto in diplo-
macy, especially for those countries that need to win the day by the strength of
their arguments.
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4.6 conclusion
This chapter has looked at how states are producing laws and policy measures
which use the Internet’s infrastructure to influence and regulate the behaviour of
people, groups, businesses and other states. The main point to remember about
the various trends described in this chapter is that states give their national or
other private interests precedence over the collective interest of a reliable and func-
tioning public core of the Internet. It should be noted that so far, any damage that
may have been done to the Internet’s public core has mostly been incidental in
nature. However, if more and more states turn increasingly to policies that inter-
vene in the Internet’s core protocols – routing, dns and ip, for example –their
accumulated actions will ultimately do serious damage to the universality, inter-
operability and accessibility of the Internet. And once that has happened, it will be
impossible to put the genie back in the bottle.
States are concerning themselves with the Internet’s technical and logical core for a
variety of reasons, including copyright protection and national security. Some-
times their actions affect the core protocols; at other times, high-risk vulnerabili-
ties in software and protocols are ‘kept secret’ so that they can be exploited later.
Such practices make the Internet as a whole less reliable, in the first place in the
technical sense, but by extension in the economic and societal/cultural senses as
well. After all, being unable to rely on the integrity, availability and confidentiality
of the Internet will affect our willingness and ability to work with and on it.
That in turn will affect the social and economic structure that we have built on that
infrastructure, from online banking to communication. Some of these practices
also simply make the Internet less secure. The overall security of cyberspace and
the users that populate it is undermined when intelligence agencies ‘preserve’ vul-
nerabilities to facilitate cyber attacks, and when they deliberately build backdoors
and weaknesses into the standards and software that everyone uses in order to give
themselves easier access to data traffic. As Bruce Schneier put it, ‘You can’t build a
back door that only the good guys can walk through’.
Our main conclusion is that governments need to exercise enormous restraint
when considering policies, legislation and operational activities that intervene in
the Internet’s core protocols. At the same time, private parties must not be allowed
to take liberties with the Internet’s public core. Self-restraint is the biggest chal-
lenge in this respect. Ideally, the international norm should be non-intervention
in the core protocols and basic technology of the public Internet. In Chapter 5,
we will frame this idea as a core diplomatic challenge for the future. Restraint is a
highly complex matter, however, as the benefits of policies serving the national
interests accrue directly to national states, whereas the initial costs are borne col-
lectively. But that logic only holds true in the short run. Everything that under-
mines the integrity and security of the Internet’s global architecture will ulti-
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mately boomerang on every national state, giving it the hallmarks of a collective
action problem. It is also more difficult for states to exercise self-restraint if the pol-
icy in question is framed more in terms of a national security issue. Various pieces
of legislation concerning online copyright protection bit the dust because, for the
first time ever, freedom of speech and the Internet’s operation as a whole were
deemed to outweigh the economic interests involved. It was also one of the first
times that a large online popular movement weighed in on the decision making.
It is traditionally much more difficult to approach national security in this manner
because it is shrouded in secrecy, is not subject to international law, and security
quickly tends to trump other considerations. Just as in the non-virtual world,
national interests often prevail in cyberspace. Even so, what we have here is an
unadulterated digital version of the security dilemma, with cumulative interven-
tions motivated by national security ultimately seriously undermining the secur-
ity of the Internet.
In these border skirmishes between national security and the public Internet,
restraint has little or no chance of succeeding without sufficient counterpressure.
If we frame it in terms of Deibert’s model of distributed security, what we lack is
mixture and division – multiple actors with their own roles, powers and responsi-
bilities. That is a serious problem when the issue is national security. The multi-
stakeholder model is often put forward as a good way to give multiple relevant
actors a role in governing the Internet, but a role cannot create counterpressure on
its own if it is not accompanied by powers and responsibilities. That is in fact
increasingly the case because states are demanding more responsibility and are
pushing their own agendas. sopa, pipa and acta would probably have become
law if they had not met with resistance from a broad coalition, including key fig-
ures in the technical community and major Internet companies and sites which
forced politicians to acknowledge their responsibility for the governance of the
global Internet. While outrage about the Snowden revelations and the implica-
tions for national security is widespread, there has been scarcely any organised
marshalling of counter-power. We can explain this in part by the lack of interna-
tional rules and the fact that almost all states grant their agencies the same powers.
The question, however, is whether democratic and judicial oversight of these agen-
cies is adequate in our high-tech, Big Data era. That question in on the table in the
Netherlands, where the legislation underpinning its intelligence and security
agencies (wiv) is currently under review. In the us, the Senate recently killed a bill
(the usa Freedom Act) that would have introduced more oversight of the nsa and
placed (somewhat) stricter limits on its surveillance. For the time being, then,
nothing will change.20
There is some counterpressure from a number of the big Internet companies that
were put on the spot by Snowden’s leaks. Knowingly or unknowingly, they had
delivered bulk data to the intelligence services. They are now responding by issu-
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ing transparency reports disclosing – in so far as the law permits – which data or
records governments request or demand. They are also improving their data
encryption methods for users. The security agencies are working against them on
both counts. And yet their response can be seen as a first move towards counter-
power, with encryption raising the cost of mass surveillance and forcing the agen-
cies to fine-tune their surveillance activities. Another example is the legal battle
between the us and Microsoft in which the us government is demanding that
Microsoft hand over data stored on a server in Ireland. Microsoft has refused
because these data fall under Irish law, whereas the us reasons that it has the right
to subpoena data held by a us company regardless of where they keep it.21 Oddly
enough, then, it is the major Internet companies that are battling government in
defence of their customers’ privacy, even though they themselves habitually trans-
gress and push back the boundaries of privacy when it comes to managing their
customers’ data internally. Seeing how powerful these information giants are and
the crucial role they play in digitising the lives of entire populations, governments
can no longer avoid diplomatic dealings with them. These companies are more
than potential investors that must be recruited, more than violators of privacy that
must be tackled: they are parties that merit serious diplomatic attention owing to
their vital role in digital life, with all the contradictions inherent in diplomacy.
In the same vein, governments must be clearer about what they expect of the many
intermediaries in cyberspace that facilitate digital life, starting with the isps but
also including search engines, cloud services, and so on. In a sense, these organisa-
tions are caught between a rock and a hard place. They are expected to deal ethi-
cally and responsibly with their customers, but also to comply with the demands
of the competent authorities. In terms of Western standards, that may mean that
Google can work with the us government but not with the Chinese. Although that
may make sense from the perspective of human rights and the democratic rule of
law, we are beginning to feel the absence of measured national strategies and a
structured international discussion exploring what intermediaries may and may
not do and what governments may and may not demand. When faced with a gov-
ernment request or subpoena (whether or not made in secret), intermediaries cur-
rently have three options: compliance, resistance and pre-emption. The last of
these is undesirable from a rule-of-law perspective, and the first two are probably
both necessary with a view to the separation of powers. Compliance alone or
resistance alone would be problematic. We have yet to see the start of a structured
discussion on this topic, certainly at international governmental level. A number
of ngo’s including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Centre for Internet
Society India and Article 19 did launch the ‘Manilla Principles’22 in 2015, a frame-
work that outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details
how to minimize the damage a takedown can do.
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right-protected electronic files on its network. A filtering system of this kind requires the
provider to actively monitor all electronic communication on its network, which does not
guarantee that a fair balance has been struck between the protection of intellectual property
rights on the one hand and the freedom to conduct a business, the right to personal data pro-
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links that connect the two companies’ data centres. bullrun is a decryption program run by
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by influencing encryption standards so that they have weaknesses and ‘backdoors’.
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22 See: https://www.manilaprinciples.org/.
88 t h e  p u b l i c  c o r e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n e t
5 towards an international agenda for
internet governance
5.1 introduction: internet governance between the
technical and the political
Everyday life without the Internet has become unimaginable. It is rooted in our
social lives, our purchasing behaviour, our work and our relationship with govern-
ment, and is increasingly embedded in everyday objects and devices, from smart
meters to the cars we drive and the moveable bridges that we cross en route. For a
long time, Internet governance was the exclusive domain of what is known in
Internet circles as the ‘technical community’. That community laid the founda-
tions for the social and economic interconnectedness of our physical and digital
lives. And those foundations, with the Internet Protocol as the most prominent
component, continue to function as the robust substructure of our digital exis-
tence. But the governance of that substructure has become controversial.
The many interests, opportunities and vulnerabilities associated with the Internet
have led governments to take much more interest in the governance of cyberspace.
Moreover, in terms of policymaking, the centre of gravity has shifted from what
was primarily an economic approach (the Internet economy, telecommunications
and networks) to one that focuses more on national and other forms of security:
the Internet of cybercrime, vulnerable critical infrastructures, digital espionage
and cyber attacks. In addition, a growing number of countries are seeking to regu-
late their citizens’ behaviour online, for reasons ranging from copyright protection
and fighting cybercrime to censorship, surveillance and control of their own popu-
lations on and through the Internet.
Increasingly, governments view the core infrastructure and main protocols of the
Internet itself as a legitimate means to achieve their policy ends. Whereas Internet
governance used to mean governance of the Internet, today it also means gover-
nance using the architecture of the Internet (DeNardis 2012). States, for example,
use dns or ip protocols to block websites or make them unfindable. Such interven-
tions may have huge implications for the backbone of the Internet, something that
must be regarded as a global public good. As such, it should be protected against
the interventions of states that are acting solely in their own national interest,
thereby damaging that global public good and eroding public confidence in the
Internet. In that respect, Internet governance is at a crossroads: the Internet has
become so important that states are no longer willing or able to regard it with the
same ‘benign neglect’ that long set the tone for most countries. At the same time,
however, states simply do have national interests that go beyond the governance of
the Internet as a collective infrastructure. For the future of Internet governance it is
imperative to determine what part of the Internet should regarded as a global pub-
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lic good – and thus safeguarded from improper interference – and what part should
be seen as the legitimate domain of national states, where they can stake a claim
and take up their role without harming the infrastructure of the Internet itself.
Getting this question onto the international agenda and influencing the conduct of
states will require new diplomatic efforts.
5.2 towards a new international agenda for internet
governance
5 . 2 . 1 t h e  n e e d  f o r  c y b e r  d i p l o m a c y
If the Internet ceases to operate, many processes and routines, from the trivial
– our Facebook status – to the essential – payment transactions – will grind to a
halt. If the backbone protocols of the Internet are corrupted, the Internet becomes
unreliable. Who would risk online banking in that case? If we cannot be sure that
data will be sent and arrive at its intended destination, that will influence the kinds
of economic and social processes that we do or do not entrust to the Internet.
Would we then allow the Internet to handle our private and work-related commu-
nications? If we know that security gaps are deliberately being built into Internet
standards, protocols and hardware and software to guarantee foreign intelligence
and security services access, then our confidence in the Internet will gradually
crumble. If more and more countries withdraw behind digital borders, the Internet
will no longer operate as an international infrastructure as it has done so far. And
in the worst-case scenario, the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the core protocols
and infrastructures of the internet could lead to serious breakdowns in society and
economy.
The integrity of the public core is a conditio sine qua non for the Internet’s opera-
tion. Internet security is therefore one of the most fundamental of principles.
For one thing, the aim of building a digital economy only makes sense if the Inter-
net itself operates as it should. National and economic security also rest in part on a
robust Internet infrastructure. Securing the Internet’s public core will require
much more coherent and political prioritisation of that goal than we see today, par-
ticularly where the international agenda is concerned. The Internet should be
regarded as a critical priority in the foreign policy of all states whose economies
and societies are interwoven with it. What is needed is the widespread interna-
tional adoption of a diplomatic approach that gives precedence to the Internet’s
public core. The public core of the Internet’s infrastructure not only requires states
to take political action but also requires them to exercise restraint. That is a tall
order for most countries in an uncertain (digital) world. Moreover, the diplomatic
efforts that are needed to protect the public core of the Internet also require that
states first put their own houses in order.
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Smaller states are to some extent well placed to be in the vanguard of this diplo-
matic effort. Whereas large states often rely on ‘hard’ economic and military
power, small states usually seek refuge in what Nye (2011: 20-21) calls ‘soft power’,
i.e. influencing other states by formulating and framing the agenda, persuading
others and generating positive interest in preferred outcomes (the good example).
And whereas large and powerful states may benefit from ‘strategic ambivalence’,
with the lack of clear-cut standards allowing scope for negotiation and room to
manoeuvre, smaller states have a vested interest in channelling the discourse
towards standardisation. Moreover, for a country such as the Netherlands, for
example, protecting the Internet’s public core follows from its own national inter-
ests. The reliable operation of the Internet is vital to the Dutch economy, long
term economic growth and the functioning of Dutch society, both digital and real-
world. The Netherlands has a lively Internet industry, and ams-ix is one of the
biggest Internet Exchange Points in the world (Deloitte 2014). The size of the over-
all Internet economy is difficult to measure, however, with new technologies
emerging rapidly and with online and offline economy activity being closely inter-
twined (oecd 2014b). A recent estimate (Deloitte 2014) puts it at 5.3 percent of
gdp. The Boston Consultancy Group (2014; 2011) has produced a somewhat lower
figure of just over 4 percent, but it ranks the Netherlands among the top ten coun-
tries worldwide with the largest Internet economies, proportionately speaking. In
other words, the Netherlands has much to gain when it comes to the functioning
of the Internet’s core infrastructures. It is however not alone in this. Many coun-
tries depend on the ‘health’ of the Internet, and as the digitisation of many parts of
the world is still ongoing, their numbers are growing.
It is far from unusual for smaller states to assist at the birth of international stan-
dards or diplomatic breakthroughs. Developing and disseminating a new agenda
for cyber diplomacy, based on the notion that the Internet’s core must be safeguar-
ded as a global public good, could be a task better suited to the leadership of the
smaller rather than the bigger powers. The underlying principle – that safeguarding
that public core also follows on from the national interests of other states – can
serve to frame the international agenda. Diplomatic history offers an interesting
example in this respect. The process towards the establishment of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty began when Ireland proposed banning the distribution
of nuclear technology at a meeting of the un’s General Assembly. It was thus a
small state with no nuclear capacity which took the initiative to formulate the first
principles for a key international standard of restraint and, eventually, a regime of
non-proliferation.
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5.3 framing the agenda
This international agenda for Internet governance is grounded in Ronald Deibert’s
ideas about distributed security (see Chapter 2). That concept emphasises the need
to organise power and counterpower in the international domain of Internet gov-
ernance, the aim being to guarantee freedom. Deibert identifies three key princi-
ples of negarchy, borrowed from the context and tradition of national liberal
democracy, which could be adapted to the international context. Those principles
are mixture, division and restraint. Mixture refers to giving multiple actors roles
and responsibilities in the system. Division is a design principle whereby none of
these actors is able to control the system without the cooperation and consent of
others. The principle of restraint involves reining in power by organising a system
of checks and balances, for example in the form of oversight. Restraint can be both
intrinsic – with parties placing checks on themselves – or enforced or monitored
extrinsically through oversight by external parties or by means of administrative
and legal arrangements.
These three principles cannot simply be transferred indiscriminately from the
national to the international arena. Because institutions – with all their rules, pro-
cedures and responsibilities – play a more limited role internationally than in the
national arena, the principles of mixture, division and restraint must allow for
those parties that have the actual authority and/or power. In the cyber domain,
these are often private parties. That does not mean that there are no formal and
informal mechanisms in force that limit state sovereignty. There is a network of
international and regional organisations in place – among them the un and its sub-
sidiaries, the eu, the au, asean etc. – which set boundaries for the conduct of
states. Moreover, there is a body of international law that emerged both within and
outside these organisations, which sets binding rules and standards for states and
imposes obligations on them. But informal standards, mutual expectations, warn-
ings and threats also play an important role in international relations. It is within
the full breadth of this international political and legal context that Internet gover-
nance must ultimately be shaped. In some cases, that process can fall into step with
ongoing international initiatives and take place within existing international legal
and organisational contexts; in other cases, it will require the breaking of new dip-
lomatic ground.
This section considers two main items for a cyber-diplomacy agenda that impli-
citly reflect Deibert’s principles in various ways. The first is that the Internet’s pub-
lic core must be safeguarded against improper state interference driven by national
interests. A standard of non-intervention should be adopted for the core architec-
ture of the Internet. The second item focuses on de-securitising international
cyberpolitics, for example by making a clearer distinction between different forms
of security related to the Internet and to the parties involved.
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5 . 3 . 1 t h e  i n t e r n e t ’ s  p u b l i c  c o r e  s h o u l d  b e  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n e u t r a l
z o n e
This study has argued that the Internet consists of core protocols and technology
that must be considered a global public good. If core protocols like tcp/ip, dns and
routing protocols do not operate properly, the Internet’s very operation will come
under pressure. If these protocols are corrupted, everyone loses. The Internet is
‘broken’ if we can no longer assume that the data we send will arrive, that we can
locate the sites we are searching for, and that those sites will be accessible. As a
global public good, the Internet only works properly if its underlying values – uni-
versality, interoperability and accessibility – can be guaranteed and if it facilitates
the main objectives of data security, i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availability.
In 2008, the German Federal Constitutional Court formulated a new fundamental
right to the ‘confidentiality and integrity’ of it systems that clearly encompasses a
number of these values.1 It is vital that we – the users – can rely on the most funda-
mental Internet protocols to function properly. After all, those protocols underpin
our entire online social and economic existence , and our confidence in that struc-
ture thus very much depends on them.
The need for worldwide agreement about the importance of properly functioning
protocols seems obvious because it is these protocols that guarantee the reliability
of the global Internet. However, recent international trends in policymaking and
legislation governing the protection of copyright, defence and national security,
espionage and various forms of censorship show that something else is afoot here.
Some states see dns, routing protocols, standards and the trend towards building
in, keeping secret and manipulating software, hardware and protocol vulnerabili-
ties as ideal ‘tools’ for national policy intent on monitoring, influencing and block-
ing the conduct of people, groups and companies. The external effects of such
interventions in the core of the public Internet fall on the collective, however, and
impairs the core values and operation of the Internet.
Within the scope of copyright, a dynamic coalition of engineers, Internet compa-
nies and websites, ngos and users managed to block two us bills – the Stop
Online Piracy Act (sopa) and the protect ip Act (pipa) – and the Anti-Counter-
feiting Trade Agreement (acta), all three of which would have permitted the use
of vital Internet protocols to regulate and block content. These protests made poli-
ticians aware that such interventions actually involved tampering with the Inter-
net itself. Crushing these bills has not wiped the ideas and technology behind this
type of legislation off the map, however.
States take even greater liberties with the Internet’s public core when it comes to
their national security. Military cyber commands, intelligence and security agen-
cies, and sometimes even law enforcement agencies are increasingly putting
national security above the collective interest of a properly functioning Internet.
t o w a r d s  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g e n d a  f o r  i n t e r n e t  g o v e r n a n c e 93
Because these policies concern national security – or at least are ‘framed’ in that
way – most national legislatures have a strong tendency to support them. An addi-
tional factor with respect to intelligence agencies is that they are regulated solely at
national level, as there is virtually no international law pertaining to them.
Taken together, these trends could lead to a digital version of the security dilemma
(Jervis 1978), in which the use of cyberspace as an instrument for national security,
in the sense of both cyber warfare and mass surveillance by intelligence services,
undermines the overall level of cyber security on a global scale (Dunn Cavelty
2014). There is an enormous risk that the cumulative effect of national measures
– with states increasingly engaged in a ‘cyber arms race’ – will introduce serious
vulnerabilities into the core of the Internet as a public infrastructure. On top of
this, there is the paradox that some parts of national government have made safe-
guarding a reliable and secure Internet their mission whereas other parts are
increasing the risk in this area.
To some degree we are still at the start of this development. A number of powerful
states have built up significant cyber capacity and are way ahead of the rest in this
trend, which is a dubious one from the vantage point of the Internet as a global
public good and global Internet security. But many countries are now in the mid-
dle of digitising their state, economy and society and are still building cyber
capacity. When the next billion (or billions) of users go online in the years ahead,
these states will develop their own national policies in relation to the online world
and will have to ask themselves whether or not they will use the core protocols and
infrastructure of the Internet instrumentally in those efforts. Some of these coun-
tries have authoritarian regimes with a history of controlling and sometimes
repressing their own population, and using modern technology to do so. There is
no guarantee that these countries will spare the Internet’s public core as their
societies continue to digitise. In addition, many countries will have upgraded their
technical cyber capacity considerably within a few years, giving a much larger
group of states capacities that are currently reserved for only a few superpowers.
What is cutting edge today will be commonplace in five years’ time. If in that same
timeframe the idea takes hold that national states are at liberty to decide whether
or not to intervene in the Internet’s main protocols to secure their own interests,
the impact on the Internet as a global public good is likely to be very damaging. For
this reason there is no time to lose in securing the public core of the Internet.
Given these developments, it should be an internationally shared priority to work
towards establishing an international standard that identifies the main protocols of
the Internet as a neutral zone in which governments are prohibited from interfer-
ing for the sake of their national interests. This should be considered an extended
national interest (Knapen et al. 2011), i.e. a specific area where national interests and
94 t h e  p u b l i c  c o r e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n e t
global issues coincide for all states that have a vital interest in keeping the Internet
infrastructure operational and trustworthy. With the continuing spread of the
Internet and ongoing digitisation, that is increasingly a universal concern.
• In order to protect the Internet as a global public good there is a need to estab-
lish and disseminate an international standard stipulating that the Internet’s
public core – its main protocols and infrastructure, which are a global public
good – must be safeguarded against intervention by governments.
In terms of distributed security, the main challenge in this context will be to
organise negation and restraint of power at the international level, with restraint
being the intrinsic task assigned to states (they must place restrictions on them-
selves) and negation being the task assigned to the collective (how can the stan-
dard be established and monitored?). The first task will be to get the drafting of
such a standard onto the international political agenda, and that will require mak-
ing governments all around the world aware of the collective importance of this
neutral zone. Given the enormous differences between countries in terms of Inter-
net access, overall digitisation and technological know-how, this will require a tre-
mendous diplomatic effort. The task of restraint naturally goes beyond merely
establishing a standard, but doing so is a vital first step and can provide an impor-
tant reference point.
Operational strategy
One important question in this context is whether a standard of this kind should
immediately take the form of a treaty or convention. Doing so, however, makes the
substance of the convention subject to a multilateral negotiation game in which
the outcome is often the lowest common denominator. There are advantages to
dividing up the efforts into smaller steps instead of banking on a treaty governing
the Internet or a convention that regulates cyber conflicts and cyber warfare. Stan-
dards have already been a topic of discussion at many conferences in the cyber
domain, recently also attracting input from private parties such as Microsoft
(2015), arguing mainly for norms that states should adhere to. They have also been
the subject of a series of gges (Groups of Governmental Experts) on information
security. Acting under the auspices of the un but not under any treaty, these gges
have attempted to establish standards, principles and Confidence-Building Meas-
ures (cbms) pertaining to the Internet and international security (Kane 2014;
Hurwitz 2014). In 2015 the most recent gge delivered its report addressing issues
such as the problem of backdoors in ict products and requesting states to prevent
their proliferation.2 An international standard that designates the Internet’s core
protocols as a neutral zone would have a broader and more potent impact if it were
negotiated and disseminated in parallel to the route of the gge, which focuses on
national security and on preventing escalations of cyber conflicts. Moreover, the
advantage of a standard that defines the Internet as a global public good is that it
avoids any direct attempt to regulate intelligence and security agencies interna-
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tionally. Considerations of sovereignty are likely to make any such direct attempt
impossible. The standard of non-intervention has an indirect effect because it lim-
its what is and is not permissible on the Internet within the context of national
security. Compliance with the standard would be subject to national democratic
and legal oversight. Although disseminating this standard does not in itself guar-
antee compliance, it does create a benchmark for evaluating and judging the con-
duct of states – even those that have not recognised the standard officially.
The starting point would be to define and draft the standard and to disseminate it
within international forums that are relevant for various aspects of Internet gover-
nance. It could be disseminated through relevant un forums and bodies, as well as
though regional organisations such as the Council of Europe, the oecd, the osce,
asean and the au. This strategy would lay the foundations for what could even-
tually expand into a broader regime.
5 . 3 . 2 t h e  n e e d  t o  d i s e n t a n g l e  i n t e r n e t  s e c u r i t y  a n d  n a t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y
The second item on the diplomatic agenda is the need to steer the debate about
Internet governance away from the domain of national security and to disentangle
the various forms of security that are relevant to and on the Internet. The increased
emphasis on national security has had a negative impact on the debate on cyber
security. Some researchers maintain that cyber security and cyber warfare have
become part of a ‘securitised’ discourse (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009; Dunn
Cavelty 2013; Singer and Friedman 2013). Many governments are seriously invest-
ing in capacity-building in the realm of national and international cyber security in
response to what is a relatively poorly defined threat. The term ‘threat inflation’ is
often used to explain the rapidly expanding cyber security budgets and legislated
powers, especially in the United States. This could lead to a far-reaching militarisa-
tion of the cyber domain, the rise of a new cyber military-industrial complex and
even an arms race in cyberspace. This is in spite of the fact that initial attempts to
study how the law of armed conflict applies to cyber conflicts, such as the Tallinn
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, show that, so far,
not a single cyber incident conforms to the legal definitions of ‘war’.
The emphasis on national security comes at the expense of a broader range of
views on security and the Internet. Defining and disentangling different views on
security may in fact improve the security of the Internet as a collective infrastruc-
ture.
• It is therefore vital to advocate at the international level that a clear differentia-
tion be made between Internet security (security of the Internet infrastruc-
ture) and national security (security through the Internet) and to disentangle
the parties responsible for each.
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It is of paramount importance to delineate the various forms of security in relation
to the Internet. At one end of the spectrum there is the notion of Internet security,
i.e. ensuring that the network itself is secure and operational. At the other end
there is the notion of national security, with the focus on the state and the Internet
being regarded simultaneously as a source of threat and as a potential policy tool.
Between the two ends of the spectrum is a view that focuses more on cybercrime
and has law enforcement agencies as the primary national, regional and interna-
tional actors. Across the entire spectrum, private parties also play various roles: as
developers and suppliers of technology, as businesses that protect their own net-
works, and as consultants which implement ‘security’ on or by means of the Inter-
net, for clients ranging from Shell to the nsa.
Internet security relates to a technology-driven strategy, such as that of the Com-
puter Emergency Response Teams (certs) which involves a public health-type
approach to overall network security. The aim is to maintain the health of the
Internet as a network for the benefit of all users. Trust, a shared understanding of
network security and information-sharing have been key ingredients contributing
to the gradual growth of international cooperation between the various certs. It is
important not to confuse and/or mix this logic with that of national security,
which places national interests above network interests. Importantly, a strict divi-
sion is required between the actors responsible for national security, such as the
military and the intelligence and security services, and parties such as the certs
which safeguard the security of the Internet itself. The recent 2015 gge report
takes a similar line by urging states to neither harm the systems and activities of
other (national) certs, nor to use their own to engage in malicious international
activity.3 The principle of division is of paramount importance here. Confusing the
two logics, or allowing the national security logic to dominate, could seriously
impair the mutual trust that the technical community has managed to build over
the course of many years. These two forms of security must remain separate, even
in periods when the security of the online and offline world is under threat. Nor
should they be mixed under the pressure of budgetary restraints and a scarcity of
qualified computer experts that is felt by various government agencies active in the
broader field of cyber security (Broeders 2014).
Division is important as well because the logic of national security implies a much
lower tolerance of risk and therefore a much higher risk of escalation. There is little
political scope for ‘residual risk’ and ‘trial and error’ in the realm of national secur-
ity, since a single error at the highest level of security could be fatal. That logic
brushes aside other takes on security in which the stability and integrity of the
Internet as a global public good are at least as important, if not more so. Van Eeten
and Bauer (2009) compared ‘precluded event security’ and ‘marginal security cost’
in this connection. The first involves an absolute security standard to which
almost everything else must give way; the second weighs security against the cost
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to society. Such costs go beyond the financial– security is an expensive affair – to
include intangible costs, for example fundamental rights and the rule of law (aiv
2014) and the level of trust between the organisations and individuals involved in
internet security. The point would be to allow more room for the logic of residual
risk in matters of cyber security and to apply the logic of national security more
selectively in order to avoid or mitigate escalation.
Operational strategy
The debate concerning the highest levels of national security – military cyber com-
mands and intelligence and security agencies – is simultaneously the most crucial
and the most complicated from a perspective of restraint. Considerations of state
sovereignty make regulating these actors through international law or agreements
a highly complex affair. It should be noted, however, that this is a new area in
which some issues will remain the same – and the offline rules should ‘simply’ be
adapted to create online rules – and some will change considerably. As the fifth
domain of warfare, cyberspace is not only an entirely man-made construct but is
also largely in private hands. That raises new questions about what is and is not
permissible and how much states, for example, are allowed to interfere in private
hardware and software. The lively trade in ‘zero-day vulnerabilities’ – flaws in
everyday software and hardware that intelligence agencies and military cyberunits
can exploit to gain access to private systems and information – is taking place in a
grey area. As complicated as it may seem, we can improve the regulation of this
domain by launching a serious national and international political debate about
what countries do and do not consider acceptable, and how to weigh their con-
cerns against other views on cyber and Internet security. Unfortunately, it is an
issue that has probably only made it onto the desk of government and the floor of
the legislature in a very small number of capitals worldwide. In the business world,
cyber security is now increasingly a matter for the ceo and his or her boardroom.
Cyber and Internet security – and the external effects of favouring one take on
security on the Internet over another – should also be discussed by the cabinet and
in the legislature.
We are only at the start of this process in the international arena, despite existing
international agreements to work on establishing ‘norms, rules and principles of
responsible behaviour of states’ in the cyber domain, for example as stipulated in
the Seoul Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace.4
There are, of course, various initiatives under way to arrive at common standards,
but the discourse is taking place mainly within the context of the high politics of
international security and is intended to prevent escalation between states. The
Groups of Governmental Experts (gge) and other similar initiatives emphasise
codes of conduct and Confidence-Building Measures that are meant to prevent
states from misinterpreting each other’s conduct online. Such measures may result
in information-sharing about national cyberstrategies, dialogues between various
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states, and international assistance for weaker states in building cyber capacity for
defensive purposes (Kane 2014; Hurwitz 2014). A clear division between different
forms of security and the delineation of the domains of the various actors involved
could be beneficial in these ongoing international discourses about standards in
cyberspace and their regional versions, such as nato and the osce in Europe and
asean in Asia. That is certainly true if the rationale behind these positions is the
idea that improper intervention in the Internet’s public core should be declared
out of bounds. This standard can also help disentangle various forms of security,
since some views on security do support the integrity of the public core – Internet
security – whereas other forms of national security may avail themselves of instru-
ments that in fact damage it. Another matter to consider is the need to determine
what might be possible and acceptable forms of transparency with respect to the
activities of the various parties. In terms of Internet security as viewed by the
certs, the Cyber Green Initiative is one of several ongoing initiatives (see Chap-
ter 3). In terms of national security, transparency has so far mainly resulted from
the actions of whistleblowers such as Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden.
Transparency at a – necessarily – high and abstract level in domestic politics could
make it easier to assess the usefulness and necessity of certain national pro-
grammes pursued by intelligence or security agencies and, by offering reassurance,
could serve as a confidence-building measure internationally (see also Swire 2015).
Robust systems of judicial and democratic oversight at the national level could be
important building blocks for improving international relations in cyberspace, as
well as institutional safeguards against domestic and international abuse of power
by these agencies.
5.4 broadening the diplomatic arena
The third item on the agenda for cyber diplomacy is more procedural in nature and
focuses on the parties that should be involved in or be the subject of the diplomatic
efforts. Broadening the diplomatic arena should be an important part of the inter-
national agenda for Internet governance. The demographic shift in engagement
with the Internet and the rise of new large and mid-level powers in relation to the
Internet, challenges the still very dominant transatlantic take on Internet gover-
nance. Also, the damage done to the us’s moral leadership in Internet matters as a
result of the Snowden revelations has undercut the ‘Western’ dominance in the
debates about Internet governance. It is therefore time to open, broaden and
expand the arena for cyber diplomacy. There is a need to involve states that are still
building their technical and political cyber capacities – for example the so-called
‘swing states’ – fully in debates about Internet governance. Secondly, there is a
strong case to be made for targeting the big Internet-based companies as explicit
subjects of cyber diplomacy, as well as a need to think through and regulate what
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the role and position of intermediary organisations on the Internet – such as Inter-
net Service Providers (isps) – is and should be. Lastly, states should develop a real-
istic approach to the role of ngos and other stakeholders.
5 . 4 . 1 t h e  n e e d  t o  b u i l d  n e w  c o a l i t i o n s
The challenge for Internet governance is how to build new, broad coalitions that
are willing to support a standard that protects the Internet’s public core. While the
‘usual suspects’ in the transatlantic axis, i.e. the eu and the oecd, are important
actors in Internet governance, the bigger challenge lies elsewhere. The conversa-
tion between ‘like-minded’ allies will help to bring the desired standards and
norms into focus, but the real impact in this arena will come from dialogue with
states that are outside that circle (Hurwitz 2014: 330). That became clear during the
2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications in Dubai, when it
was time to vote on the International Telecommunications Regulations (itrs).
The Western camp found itself in the minority when its members voted against
new itrs that would increase state influence over the Internet and could poten-
tially open the door to its nationalisation, or balkanisation. In addition to countries
that have opposing notions of the Internet and Internet governance, there is also a
large group of countries that have not yet taken up a firm position on the issue of
Internet governance. These states are developing their strategy, policies and
capacity to engage with Internet governance issues, especially at the international
level. As sovereign nations, they have a seat in relevant regional and international
organisations, and many of them join in negotiations about certain specific mat-
ters, such as the iana stewardship transition and the itrs referred to above.
It should also be noted that the digital superpowers of today – at least in terms of
numbers of Internet users – will not necessarily be the superpowers of tomorrow.
A demographic shift is taking place in cyberspace, with the centre of gravity mov-
ing from the North and West to the East and South. Voices other than European
and American ones will grow louder in the near future and will emphasise other
economic and political ideas.
The principle of restraint surfaces in various areas, for example in the debate about
the transition process for the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (iana)stew-
ardship. The question there is what form that stewardship – currently in the hands
of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, or icann (under
contract with the us government) – should take. One good starting point would
be to draw a clear distinction between oversight (the iana stewardship) and
icann’s more politically controversial tasks, for example creating new domain
names. As a densely networked country and the host of an important digital
exchange, the Netherlands would benefit greatly from technical management that
is as ‘agnostic’ as possible. The management of domain names and numbering
facilities – the beating heart of the Internet address system – must keep the realm
of politics at bay as far as possible. In the interest of maintaining the Internet in the
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long term as a properly operating collective infrastructure, there is every reason to
disseminate this viewpoint actively in the international arena and to broaden the
coalition of states that subscribe to it.
Operational strategy
In diplomatic terms, it is clear that there is much to be gained by engaging with the
large group of countries that have not yet taken up a firm position on various issues
of Internet governance. Diplomatic efforts focused on securing the public core of
the Internet will only succeed through effective engagement with these states,
which could represent a political middle ground between the two extremes in the
discussion. Maurer and Morgus (2014) identified a ‘top thirty’ of swing states
worldwide by combining the voting results for the new international telecommu-
nications treaty with a broad range of criteria, including membership of interna-
tional organisations and degree of democratisation. They also looked at Internet
penetration, the presence of an active Internet community and the size of the digi-
tal economy. These swing states are neither the ‘like-minded’ states of the ‘West-
ern camp’ nor the ‘other-minded’ states with repressive and dictatorial regimes.
Nor are they very small states or states with few resources that are considered to
have little influence. As such they are an important starting point for building new
coalitions and broadening existing ones.
International dialogue on these subjects has already begun, but needs to be rein-
forced. For example, the eu also has a number of institutionalised strategic part-
nerships with important third-party countries with which it regularly engages in
dialogue. In fact, it is already involved in ‘cyberdialogues’ with the usa, Brazil,
China and India, although the nature of these discussions differs considerably in
each case. It is also working to broach the subject of the Internet with other coun-
tries, including Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and South Korea (Renard
2014).5 A number of the eu’s strategic partners – Brazil, Mexico, India, South
Africa and South Korea – also appear on the list of swing states. Moreover, the eu
Member States decided in early 2015 to develop and implement a ‘common and
comprehensive eu approach for cyber diplomacy at global level’.6 Part of this deci-
sion involves developing ‘norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace’.
Multilateral initiatives such as these should be expanded where possible, but
should not stop individual states from embarking on their own dialogues and
developing their own initiatives where necessary or useful.
5 . 4 . 2 m a k e  p r i v a t e  p a r t i e s  p a r t  o f  t h e  d i p l o m a t i c  d i a l o g u e
In the predominantly privately owned and run world of the Internet, Apple,
Google, Huawei, Microsoft and other corporate giants are forces to be reckoned
with. It is they who largely decide what our online lives look like and what new
directions the information society will take. This also means that, more than in the
past, these corporations should be approached from the perspective of diplomacy
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and the rule of law. This is a matter of power and counterpower, and – as in diplo-
matic relations between states – the interests and agendas of such corporations
will sometimes align and sometimes conflict with national and collective political
interests. For example, it is not clear why most Western countries maintain dia-
logues about human rights with authoritarian regimes but not with companies
that are vital to the protection of privacy and freedom of communication around
the world (aiv 2014).
Given that large Internet companies are powerful and influential actors in Internet
governance, they should be much more explicitly part of the diplomatic arena. Rel-
evant issues include, but are not limited to, privacy and data protection, market
dominance, the security of hardware and software and data protection by means of
encryption. Many governments are relatively weak parties in their dealings with
these private-sector giants, for reasons of size and resources and also because of
economic interests and dependencies in relation to these corporations. Regional
organisations such as the eu sometimes take a stand. But even though the eu’s
political weight is considerable, its gears grind slowly compared to the fast-paced
Internet economy. That much became clear in the infamous case that the European
Commission brought against Microsoft under eu competition law. While the fine
was high and proportionate ($860 million), the proceedings took so long that it
was tantamount to ‘solving the antitrust problem long after the competitors have
died’ (Brown and Marsden 2013: 40). Nevertheless, the authority to impose heavy
sanctions – which is also part of the current negotiations with regard to the eu
data protection regulation – gives the eu and its Member States more muscle in
their dialogue with these companies. The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ can be an impor-
tant incentive for private parties to engage in serious dialogue with states (Börzel
and Risse 2010). Governments need to realise that being on the receiving end of a
lobbying campaign by these powerful companies is not the same as – or a substi-
tute for – engaging in a diplomatic dialogue with them.
Recently, Internet companies have pushed back both informally and formally
against governments, and especially against the us. This was mostly the result of
the Snowden revelations, which have seriously damaged the global reputation of a
number of leading American Internet companies among Internet users. Snowden’s
files put these big Internet-based companies on the spot as they were – intention-
ally or unintentionally – the sources of masses of data collected by the intelligence
services. Some of Silicon Valley’s biggest Internet companies are responding by
stepping up the use of transparency reports that disclose – as far as the law per-
mits – what data or records governments request or demand, and by using increas-
ingly sophisticated encryption of their data transport (Van Hoboken and Rubin-
stein 2014). Although opportunism and damage control explain much of this
behaviour aimed at retaining and regaining customers, it is an interesting develop-
ment in terms of power and counterpower. By raising the cost of mass surveillance
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through better encryption, and thus putting pressure on intelligence services to
fine-tune their surveillance, their response may be seen as a move towards coun-
terpower. Microsoft is also taking on the us government in the courtroom, chal-
lenging its assertion that all data managed by a us company – even if it is held on
servers in Ireland – can be commandeered by government.7 In the light of their
economic weight and their crucial role in shaping the information society on a
global scale, governments can no longer avoid diplomatic dealings with these
information giants. These companies are more than potential investors that have
to be seduced and recruited, and are more than violators of privacy that must be
tackled: they are parties who merit serious diplomatic attention, with all the con-
tradictions inherent in diplomacy.
In similar vein, governments need to be more explicit about what they expect of
the many intermediaries in cyberspace which facilitate digital life, starting with
isps but also including search engines, cloud services, and so on. These companies
often occupy a very uneasy middle ground between their customers and various
governments. They are expected to deal with their customers ethically and respon-
sibly, but also to comply with the legal requirements and demands of the authori-
ties. In international terms, that may sometimes be seen to mean that Google
should work with the uk government but not with the Russian government,
depending on the case and the nature of the request. Although that may make
sense from the perspective of human rights and the democratic rule of law, there is
a manifest absence of a clear understanding or even a structured discussion explor-
ing what intermediaries may and may not do and what governments may and may
not demand. When faced with a government request or subpoena, intermediaries
currently have three options for their course of action: compliance, resistance and
pre-emption. Pre-emption, where intermediaries take preventive action, such as
blocking access to websites and content without being formally requested to do so,
is undesirable from a rule-of-law perspective. Compliance and resistance are prob-
ably both necessary with a view to the division of power, although only compli-
ance or only resistance would be problematic. The deputation of private compa-
nies comes at the price of what has been termed ‘intermediary censorship’
(Zuckerman 2010; MacKinnon 2011), meaning that decision-making on what is and
is not allowed slowly shifts towards private parties. We have yet to see the start of
a structured discussion on this topic, certainly at international governmental level.
A number of ngo’s including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Centre for
Internet Society India and Article 19 did launch the ‘Manilla Principles’8 in 2015, a
framework that outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and
details how to minimize the damage a takedown can do.
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Operational strategy
One way forward may be to build on the work of John Ruggie, the un Secretary-
General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights. His work led to
the publication in 2011 of the un Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights.9 The Guiding Principles could be adapted to cover the duties and responsi-
bilities of Internet-based companies that play a major role – either de facto or
because national law forces them to do so – in online and offline human rights sit-
uations in certain countries. In June 2014, the un Human Rights Council adopted a
resolution to establish an intergovernmental working group that is to develop a
legally binding instrument on multinationals with respect to human rights.10
The protection of the Internet as a global public good, and the role that private
companies can play in this regard, could follow a similar trajectory. The framework
should make the role and responsibilities of Internet-based companies clearer and
ensure that they and governments hold each other accountable for their responsi-
bilities and obligations – and for not overstepping them. A similar process could be
launched regarding the mutual obligations of businesses and governments in pro-
tecting the public core of the Internet.
5 . 4 . 3 r e a l i s m  i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  n g o s
While many countries formally embrace the multistakeholder model of Internet
governance, this notion is at odds with the growing role that states are demanding
for themselves in this domain. The Internet is in reality governed by an amalgam of
private and semi-private parties, but with national and international regulatory
pressure mounting, governments are increasingly redefining the boundaries.
At the same time, a wide variety of different ngos are working at the national and
international level to safeguard the nature, the use, and the future of the Internet
– as they see it. The topics they address and the interests they represent vary
greatly, from the protection of human rights and dissidents online to the manage-
ment of the technical part of the Internet. Broad coalitions of ngos, concerned
web users, Internet businesses and organisations and individuals representing the
technical community can sometimes make a difference in policy development.
That is what happened in the case of sopa/pipa and acta. Some ngos have a
high-profile presence and influence internationally, but when it comes to drafting
agreements and drawing up conclusions at official conferences concerning the gov-
ernance and future of the Internet, there is often no place for them at the table. For
example, ngos turned out in force at the two meetings of the un World Summit
on the Information Society, the first in Geneva in 2003 and the second in Tunis in
2005. But when the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action were being drawn
up, it was mainly the states who were allowed to take the floor and who tightly
grasped the pen. The ngos’ input into the final texts and output documents was
small (Dutton and Peltu 2010; Cogburn 2010), feeding their frustration. At this
point, and especially after the netmundial meeting in Brazil, which gave its full
support to the multistakeholder model, states should facilitate productive input
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by ngos without raising false hopes. With Internet governance becoming more
political and subject to increasing state intervention, their contribution to the for-
mal process is more likely to decrease than increase. National states will need to
develop new strategies to make productive use of their and other stakeholders’
input – in addition to the autonomous public strategies that ngos deploy at
national and international level in their efforts to influence matters.
Operational strategy
In shaping national – and certainly international – policy, states would do well to
make the most use of the knowledge of ngos (for example about human rights in
certain countries) and the technical community (for example about the technical
consequences of proposed policy). Their input would be extremely useful when
thinking through the effects of Internet governance on the technical operation of
the Internet as a whole, because it is precisely in that area that it is vital to link dip-
lomatic knowledge and skill on the one hand to technical knowledge and skill on
the other.
5.5 new coalitions for the protection of the internet’s
public core
This book has argued that the Internet’s core of key protocols and infrastructure
should be considered a global public good. The protection of this public good
requires a new international agenda for Internet governance and a broadening of
the diplomatic arena, as well as investment in new international coalition-build-
ing. These new coalitions should work towards the establishment of an interna-
tional norm that identifies the main protocols of the Internet as a neutral zone in
which governments are prohibited from interfering for their own national inter-
ests.





2 See paragraph 13(i) of the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts On Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications In the Context of International Secur-
ity, Report as adopted, Friday 26 June.
3 See paragraph 13(k) of the adopted gge report of 26 June 2015.
4 See: https://www.gccs2015.com/sites/default/files/Seoul%20Framework.pdf.
5 See also the Outline for European Cyber Diplomacy Engagement, See also the Outline for
European Cyber Diplomacy Engagement, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-9967-2014-INIT/en/pdf.
6 See: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6122-2015-INIT/en/pdf.
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